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Belgrade Philosophical Annual
2017, br. 30, str. 83-98
jezik rada: engleski
vrsta rada: izvorni naučni članak
doi:10.5937/BPA1730083S


On some standard objections to mathematical conventionalism
(naslov ne postoji na srpskom)
Department of Philosophy, University of Reading, United Kingdom

Sažetak

(ne postoji na srpskom)
According to Wittgenstein, mathematical propositions are rules of grammar, that is, conventions, or implications of conventions. So his position can be regarded as a form of conventionalism. However, mathematical conventionalism is widely thought to be untenable due to objections presented by Quine, Dummett and Crispin Wright. It has also been argued that only an implausibly radical form of conventionalism could withstand the critical implications of Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations. In this article I discuss those objections to conventionalism and argue that none of them is convincing.

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