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Filozofija i društvo 2009, vol. 20, br. 2, str. 177-202
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Ekonomska teorija demokratije i racionalni glasač
Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, Beograd
Projekat Ministarstva nauke Republike Srbije, br. 149031: Regionalni i evropski aspekti integrativnih procesa u Srbiji - civilizacijske pretpostavke, stvarnost i izgledi za budućnost
SažetakU ovom radu biće analizirane Daunsove koncepcije ekonomske teorije demokratije i racionalnog glasača. Autor će braniti tezu da paradoks racionalnog glasača koji je karakterističan za Daunsovu teoriju ne može adekvatno da bude rešen uvođenjem pojma dužnosti u model ekonomske teorije demokratije.
Ključne reči
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