- citati u SCIndeksu: 0
- citati u CrossRef-u:0
- citati u Google Scholaru:[
 ]
- posete u poslednjih 30 dana:9
- preuzimanja u poslednjih 30 dana:5
|
|
|
2018, vol. 52, br. 3, str. 1195-1215
|
|
Jedna akcija - jedan glas - da li je vreme za promene
One share: One vote: Time for change?
Ključne reči: jedna akcija - jedan glas; akcije koje daju pravo na više glasova; sistemi glasanja; akcije za lojalnost
Keywords: one share - one vote; multiple voting shares; voting system; loyalty shares
Sažetak
Autor u ovom radu analizira pravilo jedna akcija - jedan glas dajući odgovor na pitanje da li je vreme za promene u srpskom kompanijskom pravu. Nakon određenja svrhe pravila jedna akcija - jedan glas kao mehanizma za uspostavljanje ravnoteže između upravljačkih prava akcionara i ekonomskog rizika koji akcionari snose, autor iznosi argumente za i protiv uvođenja, odnosno zadržavanja i napuštanja ovog pravila u nacionalnom pravu. U radu su analizirana dva tipa sistema glasanja u akcionarskim društvima - proporcionalni i neproporcionalni, uz prikaz uporednopravnih rešenja i dešavanja na nivou Evropske unije. Autor zaključuje da treba modifikovati rešenje koje je prihvaćeno u srpskom kompanijskom pravu, između ostalog, radi popularizovanja forme akcionarskog društva i usklađivanja pravila jedna akcija - jedan glas sa drugim institutima koji su prihvaćeni u domaćem pravu, pre svega, instituta posebnih dužnosti kontrolnog akcionara. Prema mišljenju autora, jedna akcija - jedan glas bi trebalo da bude dispozitivno, a ne imperativno pravilo. Takođe, slične promene su se desile u pojedinim uporednim zakonodavstvima. Na kaju, predložena promena bi bila u skladu sa tendencijama u pravu Evropske unije u vezi sa podsticanjem dugoročnog angažovanja akcionara.
Abstract
In this paper, the author analyses one share - one vote rule and answers the question if it is a time for change in Serbian company law. After defining the purpose of one share - one vote rule as a mechanism for creating the balance between shareholders' voting rights and economic risk borne by shareholders, the author brings forward the arguments for and against introducing as well as retaining and waiving the one share - one vote rule in national law. The author analyses two types of voting system in joint stock companies - proportional and disproportionate. Furthermore, the author provides a purview of comparative legal solutions and latest developments at the EU level. The author concludes that the solution accepted in Serbian company law should be modified, in order to, inter alia, promote the joint stock company and harmonize the one share - one vote rule with other introduced concepts in national law, especially the concept of special duties of controlling shareholders. In the opinion of the author one share - one vote should not be mandatory but a default rule. Besides, similar changes have occurred in respective comparative legislations. Finally, the change would be in accordance with the tendencies in the EU law with regard to enhancing long-term shareholder engagement.
|
|
|
|
Reference
|
|
|
*** (1996-2002) Zakon o preduzećima. Službeni list SRJ, br. 29/96, 33/96 - ispr., 29/97, 59/98, 74/99, 9/2001 - odluka SUS i 36/2002, čl. 221, st. 1 i 3
|
|
|
*** (2004-2011) Zakon o privrednim društvima. Službeni glasnik RS, br. 125/2004 i 36/2011 - dr. zakon, čl. 208, st. 1, tač. 3
|
|
|
*** (1988-1990) Zakon o preduzećima. Službeni list SFRJ, br. 77/88, 40/89, 46/90 i 61/90
|
|
|
*** (1994) Službeni list SRJ, br. 24/94 - dr. zakon, čl. 122, st. 1
|
|
|
*** (2006-2016) Zakon o preuzimanju akcionarskih društava. Službeni glasnik RS, br. 46/2006, 107/2009, 99/2011; 108/2016
|
|
|
*** (2011-2018) Službeni glasnik RS, br. 36/2011, 99/2011, 83/2014 - dr. zakon, 5/2015 i 44/2018, čl. 251, st. 1, tač. 1
|
|
   
|
Arsić, Z. (2014) Jednak tretman akcionara. Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta, Novi Sad, vol. 48, br. 2, str. 57-75
|
|
1
|
Arsić, Z. (2009) Pravo glasa akcionara - osnovni principi. Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta, Novi Sad, vol. 43, br. 2, str. 55-62
|
|
|
Bainbridge, S.M. (1991) The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19c-4. Washington University Law Review, 2, 566
|
|
|
Belinfanti, T.C. (2014) Shareholder Cultivation and New Governance. Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, 3, 831
|
|
|
Conac, P. (2017) Freedom of contract and limits to private autonomy in French company law. u: [ur.] Festschrift für Theodor Baums zum siebzigsten Geburtstag, Tübingen, Band I, 242-244
|
|
|
Dallas, L.L., Barry, J.M. (2016) Long-term shareholders and time-phased voting. Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, 40, 564
|
|
|
de Luca, N. (2009) Unequal treatment and shareholders’ welfare growth: ‘Fairness’ v. ‘Precise Equality’. Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, 34, 894
|
|
|
Ferrarini, G. (2006) “One Share - One Vote: A European Rule?”. European Company and Financial Law Review, 3(2)
|
|
|
Goshen, Z., Hamdani, A. (2016) Corporate control and idiosyncratic vision. Yale Law Journal, 3, 563
|
|
|
Hu, H.T.C., Black, B. (2006) The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership. Southern California Law Review, 4, 851
|
|
|
Huang, F. (2017) Dual Class Shares around the Top Global Financial Centres. Journal of Business Law, 2, 137
|
|
|
Khachaturyan, A. (2007) Trapped in Delusions: Democracy, Fairness and the One-Share-One-Vote Rule in the European Union. European Business Organization Law Review, 8(3): 335-367
|
|
|
Lepetić, J. (2017) Zlatne akcije između privatnog i javnog prava u praksi Suda pravde Evropske unije. Pravo i privreda, vol. 55, br. 4-6, str. 118-139
|
|
|
Lin, Y. (2017) Revisiting corporate control-enhancing mechanisms. u: [ur.] Global Capital Marktes - A Survey of Legal and Regulatory Trends, Cheltenham - Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 95
|
|
|
Lund, D.S. (2018) The Case against Passive Shareholder Voting. Journal of Corporation Law, 3, 498
|
|
|
Pacces, A.M. (2016) Exit, Voice and Loyalty from the Perspective of Hedge Funds Activism in Corporate Governance. Erasmus Law Review
|
|
|
Psarakis, G. (2008) One Share - One Vote and the Case for a Harmonised Capital Structure. European Business Law Review, 4, 710
|
|
|
Santoro, A., Di, P.C., Guarneri, P., Capogrosso, A. (2015) Deviations from the one share - one vote principle in Italy: Recent developments - multiple voting rights shares and loyalty shares. Bocconi Legal Papers, 5, 147-148
|
|
7
|
Vasiljević, M. (2017) Kompanijsko pravo - pravo privrednih društava. Beograd, 261
|
|
|
Ventoruzzo, M. (2015) The disappearing taboo of multiple voting shares: Regulatory responses to the migration of Chrysler-Fiat. u: ECGI Law Working Paper, 288, 4, https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/SSRN-id2574236.pdf, 1. October 2018
|
|
|
Wen, T. (2014) You Can't Sell Your Firm and Own It Too: Disallowing Dual-Class Stock Companies from Listing on the Securities Exchange. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 6, 1496-1497
|
|
|
Wulf, H.D. (2016) Shares in EMCA: The Time is Ripe for True No Par Value Shares in the EU, and the 2nd Directive is Not an Obstacle. European Company and Financial Law Review, 13(2)
|
|
|
|
|