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Industrija
2016, vol. 44, br. 1, str. 63-87
jezik rada: engleski
vrsta rada: izvorni naučni članak
objavljeno: 24/05/2016
doi: 10.5937/industrija1-8886
Creative Commons License 4.0
Mrežne eksternalije u telekomunikacionoj industriji - analiza srpskog tržišta
Univerzitet u Beogradu, Ekonomski fakultet

e-adresa: dejan@ekof.bg.ac.rs, dorde@ekof.bg.ac.rs

Sažetak

Rad se bavi mrežnom konkurencijom i empirijski analizira tržišnu koncentraciju, mrežne i eksternalije dolaznih poziva, interkonekciju, diskriminaciju cena i troškove prelaska na srpskom tržištu telekomunikacija. Mrežne eksternalije su uzrokovale ekspanziju ovog tržišta sve do 2008. godine. Nakon ulaska VIP-a na tržište, postojeći operateri se nisu ponašali predatorski prema VIP-u i nastojali su da profitiraju od potrošača koji su imali visoke troškove prelaska. Omogućavanje prenosa brojeva između operatera je dovelo do smanjenja cene poziva u mreži i značajnog povećanja potrošačkog viška. Nasuprot nekim prethodnim istraživanjima, ova politika je povećala nivo konkurencije na tržištu. Utvrdili smo da su korisnici kompanje sa najvećim tržišnim učešćem imali najveće koristi od pozitivnih eksternalija dolaznih poziva. Najzad, jedan operater ne primenjuje cenovnu diskriminaciju odlaznih i dolaznih poziva u romingu što ima za posledicu da njegovi korisnici imaju veći nivo negativnih eksternalija dolaznih poziva u romingu od korisnika mreža koje vrše cenovnu diskriminaciju.

Ključne reči

telekomunikacije; mrežne eksternalije; pozitivne eksternalije dolaznih poziva; troškovi prelaska; cenovna diskriminacija

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