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2021, vol. 3, br. 2, str. 9-22
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Blokčejn kao metod rešavanja hold-up problema
Blockchain as a method of resolving hold-up problem
Projekat: Ministarstvo prosvete, nauke i tehnološkog razvoja Republike Srbije (institucija: Univerzitet u Nišu, Pravni fakultet) (MPNTR - 451-03-68/2020-14/200120)
Sažetak
Problem ograničenja izbora (hold-up problem) vid je oportunog ponašanja ugovornih partnera. Nastaje kada se optimalni obim i struktura transakcija ne mogu sa sigurnošću definisati ex ante. Posledica hold up problema je da, nakon što je zasnovan ugovorni odnos, jedna od ugovornih strana traži modifikaciju distribucije koristi na način da ima viši nivo dobiti od ugovora nego što je to opravdano ulaganjima koja je učinila. U radu se ispituje potencijal blokčejn koncepta da, primenjen kao okvir "pametnih" ugovora, doprinese eliminaciji ili smanjenju mogućnosti za nastanak hold-up situacije. Blokčejn koncept svojim karakteristikama (transparentnost, zaštita integriteta podataka, deljivost) realizuje navedeni potencijal na tri načina: zasvedočavanjem transakcije putem blokčejna; osiguravanjem izvršenja (blokčejnom zasvedočene) transakcije; verifikacijom transakcija kroz decentralizovani sistem kojim se substituiše verifikacija od strane trećih subjekata (sudova ili arbitraža). Time se institut poverenja u klasičnom ("analognom") pravnom odnosu supstituiše korišćenjem blokčejn koncepta za skladištenje i upravljanje informacijama.
Abstract
The hold-up problem is a form of opportunistic behavior of contractual partners. It occurs when the optimal volume and structure of transactions cannot be defined with ex ante certainty. The consequence of the hold-up problem is that, once a contractual relationship has been established, one of the parties seeks to modify the distribution of benefits in such a way that it has a higher level of profit from the contract than is justified by the contractual investments it has made. The paper examines the potential of the Blockchain concept to, applied as a framework of "smart" contracts, contribute to the elimination or reduce opportunities for the emergence of a hold-up situation. The Blockchain concept with its characteristics (transparency, protection of data integrity, shareability) deploys the foregoing potential in three ways: by witnessing the transaction via the Blockchain; ensuring the execution of a (by Blockchain certified) transaction; by verifying transactions through a decentralized system that replaces verification by third parties (courts or arbitration). Consequently, the Blockchain concept for storing and managing information substitutes the role played by the institute of trust in the classical ("analog") legal relationship.
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