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2016, vol. 18, br. 3, str. 13-28
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Asimetrična informisanost - uzroci, posledice, tržišni i institucionalni odgovori
Asymmetric information: Causes, consequences and the market and institutional responses
Sažetak
Jedna od pretpostavki modela tržišta potpune konkurencije je simetrična (potpuna) informisanost tržišnih subjekata. Međutim, u stvarnosti tržišni subjekti su najčešće asimetrično informisani. Osnovni cilj ove analize je da ukaže da je asimetrična informisanost gotovo sveprisutna, ali se time ne dovodi u pitanje korisnost opšteg modela potpune konkurencije, već ukazuje na mogućnosti njegovog proširenja i konkretizacije. Drugi cilj je da se ukaže na posledice asimetrične informisanosti tržišnih subjekata i mogućnosti njihovog otklanjanja ili ublažavanja. Da bi se testirale i dokazale definisane hipoteze i realizovali definisani ciljevi istraživanja koriste se metode analize i sinteze, apstrakcije, komparacije, konkretizacije, generalizacije i kritičkog vrednovanja. Ključno ograničenje istraživanja je nemogućnost njegove empirijske kvantifikacije i verifikacije.
Abstract
One of the assumptions of perfect competition market model is symmetric (full) information of market participants. However, in reality, market participants are most often asymmetrically informed. The main objective of this analysis is to show that asymmetric information is almost ubiquitous, but that does not bring into question the usefulness of a general model of perfect competition, but points to the possibility of its expansion and concretisation. The second objective is to point out the consequences of asymmetric information of market participants and possibilities for their elimination or mitigation. In order to test and prove the defined hypotheses and realize the defined research objectives, methods of analysis and synthesis, abstraction, comparison, concretisation, generalization, and critical evaluation are used. The key research limitation is the inability of its empirical quantification and verification.
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