Metrika članka

  • citati u SCindeksu: [1]
  • citati u CrossRef-u:0
  • citati u Google Scholaru:[=>]
  • posete u poslednjih 30 dana:3
  • preuzimanja u poslednjih 30 dana:1
članak: 7 od 7  
Back povratak na rezultate
Panoeconomicus
2007, vol. 54, br. 1, str. 5-27
jezik rada: srpski
vrsta rada: izvorni naučni članak
objavljeno: 03/12/2007
doi: 10.2298/PAN0701005A
Da li politička nestabilnost vodi ka višoj i promenljivoj inflaciji? - analiza panel podataka
aMeđunarodni monetarni fond
bUniversidade do Mihno - NIPE, Portugal

e-adresa: aaisen@imf.org, fjveiga@gmail.com

Projekat

Portugalska Fondacija za nauku i tehnologiju, POCTI/32491/ECO/2000

Sažetak

Ekonomisti u osnovi prihvataju činjenicu da visoke i promenljive stope inflacije dovode do neefikasnosti koja smanjuje blagostanje društva. Nadalje studije su pokazale da je inflacija štetna po ekonomski rast. Međutim utvrđivanje uzroka svetske raznolikosti inflacionih iskustava predstavlja važan izazov sa kojim se struka još uvek nije suočila na zadovoljavajući način. Na osnovu širokog skupa podataka koji obuhvata preko 100 zemalja u periodu 1975-1997. i koristeći ekonometrijske tehnike dinamičnih i statičkih panel podataka, ovaj rad pokazuje da je stepen političke nestabilnosti povezan kako sa višim tako i sa promenljivim nivoima inflacije. Ovaj rad ne samo da unapređuje literaturu političke ekonomije, utvrđujući odnos između momenata inflacije i političke nestabilnosti, već ima i važne implikacije po politiku što se tiče osmišljavanja optimalnih programa stabilizacije inflacije i institucija koje povoljno deluju na stabilnost cena.

Ključne reči

Reference

Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J., Thaicharoen, Y. (2002) Institutional causes, macroeconomic symptoms: Volatility, crises and growth. NBER, Working Paper 9124, September
Aizenman, J. (1992) Competitive externalities and the optimal seignoriage. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 24 (1), 61-71
Alesina, A., Drazen, A. (1991) Why are stabilizations delayed?. American Economic Review, 81 (5), 1170-1188
Alesina, A., Tabellini, G. (1990) A positive theory of fiscal deficits and government debt. Review of Economics Studies, 57 (3), 403-414
Arellano, M., Bond, S. (1991) Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. Review of Economic Studies, 58, 277-297
Baltagi, B.H. (2001) Econometric analysis of panel data. New York, itd: Wiley
Beck, T., Clarke, G., Groff, A., Keefer, P., Walsh, P. (2001) New tools in comparative political economy: The database of political institutions. World Bank Economic Review, 15 (I), 165-176
Cukierman, A., Edwards, S., Tabellini, G. (1992) Seignioriage and political instability. American Economic Review, 82 (3), 537-555
Dollar, D. (1992) Outward-oriented developing economies really do grow more rapidly: Evidence from 95 LDCs, 1976-85. Economic Development and Cultural Change, str. 523-544
Drazen, A. (2000) Political economy in macroeconomics. New Jersey: Princeton University Press
Edwards, S., Tabellini, G. (1991) Explaining fiscal policies and inflation in developing countries. Journal of International Money and Finance, 10, Supplement, S16-S48
Fisher, S., Sahay, R., Vegh, C.A. (2002) Modern hyper and high inflations. Journal of Economic Literature, vol. XL, Septembar, str. 838
Gwartney, J., Lawson, R. (2002) Economic freedom of the world: Annual report. Vancouver B.C: Fraser Institute
Haggard, S., Kaufman, R.R. (1992) The political economy and stabilization in middle-income countries. u: The politics of economic adjustment, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
Nannestad, P., Paldam, M. (1994) The VP-function: A survey of the literature on vote and popularity functions after 25 years. Public Choice, 79, 213-245
Paldam, M. (1987) Inflation and political instability in eight Latin American countries 1946-83. Public Choice, 52, 143-168
Phelps, E. (1973) Inflation in the theory of public finance. Swedish Journal of Economics, 75, 67-82
Romer, D. (2001) Advanced macroeconomics. New York, itd: McGraw-Hill
Roubini, N., Sachs, J. (1989) Political and economic determinants of budget deficits in the industrial democracies. European Economic Review, 33, 903-938
Tabellini, G., Alesina, A. (1990) Voting on the budget deficit. American Economic Review, 80 (1), 37-49. 23
Vegh, C. (1989) Government spending and inflationary finance: A public finance approach. IMF Staff Paper, 36, str. 657-677
Veiga, F.J. (1999) What causes the failure of inflation stabilizations plans?. Journal of International Money and Finance, 18 (2), 169-194
Veiga, F.J. (2000) Delays of inflation stabilizations. Economics and Politics, 12(3), 275-295