The paper considers the position of Serbia following the unification of Germany and the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was accompanied by the USA becoming the only remaining super power in the world, the creation of a new form of hegemonism, the minimizing of the role of the United Nations the redefining of the notion of state sovereignty, the abandoning of socialism in all the countries of the 'Eastern block' and the growth of separatism and nationalism in nationally heterogeneous socialist countries. Starting from the assumption that globalization is one of the key processes for the understanding of these events, the author points out the possibility of a twofold understanding of this process: a 'positive' one according to which globalization is conceived as a growing mutual dependence of different peoples, states and regions of the world, and a 'negative' one according to which it is understood as a more or less open and enforced imposing of one model of technical and technological development, economic growth, one political system, cultural model and overall world order, with the aim of preserving and increasing the existing differences inside societies and between states in order to achieve complete control over material, spiritual and human resources on a global level. The author finds that this second type of globalization is dominant today, and points out its detrimental effects, especially on Serbia, all the while emphasizing the crucial role and responsibility of the Serbian political elite, which has labeled itself as 'socialist' and 'nationalist' and thereby created a firm basis and undeniable framework for the uniting of all its old and new opponents. Since they have different stands and interests, the Serbian elite ('isolationist') and the world one ('interventionist') of necessity are in conflict and this conflict can be followed on two levels: real and material which is hidden, and which concerns the struggle for social power and partial interests; and ideational and ideological, which is open and which manifests itself as an apparent struggle for high values and ideals (the ideology of 'defending national sovereignty' as opposed to the ideology of 'universal democratic values and heritage'). Indicating the need for essential social change, as well as the great difficulties in its initiation and achievement, the author sketches out in conclusion two possible roads future social developments in Serbia can take, one of which ('continuity') means the continuation of present policy, only in a much harder form, which leads to sharp social conflicts, the probable tearing of the country apart and its forced opening, while the other one ('discontinuity') means a decisive break with policy up to now, both internally and externally, which would create a realistic perspective for the gradual revival of civil society and normalization of relations with the most developed countries of the world. Which of these roads will be taken does not depend only on internal forces, but also on outside factors, as well as on some specific presently difficult to predict, historical events.