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2007, vol. 54, br. 1, str. 103-118
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Privatizacija u ekonomskoj teoriji
Privatization in economic theory
School of Economics, University of Montenegro, Institute for Strategic Studies and Prognoses (ISSP), Podgorica, Crna Gora
e-adresa: majad@cg.yu
Sažetak
Nijedna transakcija privatizacije državne imovine se u praksi nije realizovala shodno teorijskim pravilima po kojima se odvijaju obične tržišne transakcije. Čak se ni transakcije privatizacije državne imovine u razvijenim tržišnim ekonomijama ne mogu objasniti Walrasovim, Arrowovim ili Leontijevljevim modelima ekvilibrijuma, niti modelima ekvilibrijuma teorije igara. U svim ovim teorijskim modelima transakcije razmene odvijaju se u tržišnim uslovima i uz dominaciju privatnih svojinskih prava. Ali, uprkos tome transakscije privatizacije preduzeća u razvijenim zapadnoevropskim privredama se razlikuju od klasičnih preuzimanja kompanija, u kojima jedan privatni vlasnik kupuje kontrolni paket od drugog, takođe privatnog vlasnika. Razlog je to što država kao vlasnik prodajom svog vlasništva želi da ostvari i ne-ekonomske ciljeve. Transakcije privatizacije u tranzicionim zemljama se u još manjoj meri mogu objašnjavati klasičnim mikroekonomskim modelima, jer se privatizacija obavljala uglavnom masovno i u uslovima kad institucije tržišta i privatne svojine nijesu postojale. U radu se analizira fenomen privatizacije sa stanovišta različitih ekonomskih teorija i zaključuje da empirijski rezultati idu u prilog tvrdnji teorije javnog izbora – "public choice"-a (Buchanan, 1978), teorije "economic constitution" - ekonomskog poretka (Brennan and Buchanan, 1985), (Buchanan and Tullock, 1989), a još više teorije "kolektivne akcije" (Olson, 1982). Ove ekonomske teorije tvrde da prelaz iz jednog ekonomskog sistema u drugi, kakav je npr. prelaz iz kolektivističkog, socijalističkog sistema u kapitalizam, odnosno tržišnu ekonomiju sa dominantnom privatnom svojinom ne može da se postigne kroz izolovanu promenu pojedinih ekonomskih institucija, ma kako duboka i temeljna bila ta promena. Drugim riječima privatizacija ne može dati adekvatne rezultate ukoliko nije praćena sveobuhvatnom promenom ekonomskog sistema, jer privatizovane kompanije neće moći da funkcionišu u nepromenjenom sistemu.
Abstract
In reality privatization has never occurred according to the handbook rules of ordinary market transactions. Not even in advanced market economies can privatization transactions be described by the Walrasian or Arrowian, or Leontiefian equilibrium models, or by the equilibrium models of the game theory. In these economies transactions of privatization take place in a fairly organic way – which means that those are driven by the dominance of private property rights and in a market economy. But despite this fact Western privatization also some peculiar features as compared to ordinary company takeovers, since the state as the seller may pursue non – economic goals. Changes in the dominant form of property change positions and status of many individuals and groups in the society. That’s why privatization can even less be explained by ordinary market mechanisms in transition countries where privatizing state-owned property have happened in a mass scale and where markets and private property rights weren't established at the time process of privatization began. In this paper I’ll discuss and analyze the phenomenon of privatization in context of different economic theories arguing that empirical results go in favor of the public choice theory (Buchanan, 1978), theory of "economic constitution" (Brennan and Buchanan 1985), (Buchanan and Tullock, 1989), and theory of "collective action" (Olson, 1982). These theories argues that transition from one economic system into another, for example transition from collectivistic, socialistic system into capitalism and free market economy with dominant private property, will not happen through isolated changes of only few economic institutions, no matter how deep that changes would be. In other words privatization can not give results if it's not followed by comprehensive change of economic system because privatized companied wouldn't be able to operate in old environment.
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