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Sociološki pregled
2005, vol. 39, br. 2, str. 197-220
jezik rada: srpski
vrsta rada: izvorni naučni članak
doi:10.5937/socpreg0502197B


Ekonomske posledice korupcije u pravosuđu
Univerzitet u Beogradu, Pravni fakultet

Sažetak

Rad je posvećen istraživanju ekonomskih posledica korupcije u pravosuđu. To istraživanje je obuhvatilo i analizu ekonomskih karakteristika pravosuđa, i ekonomskih mehanizama korupcije u pravosuđu, za šta je korišćen teorijski okvir Bekerovog modela kršenja zakona. Analiza je pokazala da korupcija u pravosuđu, time što dovodi do narušavanja vladavine prava, potkopava same osnove tržišne privrede i mogućnost specijalizacije, odnosno društvene podele rada, koja uvećava ekonomsku efikasnost. Što se statičke ekonomske efikasnosti tiče, najznačajnija posledica korupcije u pravosuđu jesu visoki transakcioni troškovi koje ona generiše i alokativna neefikasnost koja odatle proizlazi. Što se dinamičke ekonomske efikasnosti tiče, analiza je pokazala da korupcija obara stope privrednog rasta i usmerava resurse ka preraspodeli, a ne ka stvaranju nove vrednosti. Pokazalo se da posledice korupcije u pravosuđu po ekonomske nejednakosti nisu značajne, naročito ne u poređenju sa prethodno identifikovanim posledicama po ekonomsku efikasnost.

Ključne reči

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