- citati u SCIndeksu: [11]
- citati u CrossRef-u:[4]
- citati u Google Scholaru:[
 ]
- posete u poslednjih 30 dana:13
- preuzimanja u poslednjih 30 dana:6
|
|
|
2014, vol. 62, br. 5-6, str. 229-250
|
|
U potrazi za novim modelom razvoja i platformom za vođenje ekonomskih politika u Srbiji - uloga industrijske politike
Quest for new development model and economic policy platform for Serbia: The role of industrial policy
Univerzitet u Beogradu, Ekonomski fakultet, Katedra za poslovnu ekonomiju i menadžment
Projekat: Strategijske i taktičke mere za rešavanje krize konkurentnosti realnog sektora u Srbiji (MPNTR - 179050)
Sažetak
Poražavajuća činjenica da je posle dvadeset pet godina tranzicije privreda Srbije još uvek nemoćna i raštimovana navodi na pitanje: zašto ljudi neprekidno rade protiv svojih interesa? Odgovor je: pogrešan sistem. Privreda Srbije je puna strukturnih neravnoteža. Najvažnija neravnoteža je nesklad između realne ekonomije i finansijskog sektora usled pogrešne strategije tranzicije i neuspešnog makromenadžmenta, inspirisanih neoliberalnom ekonomskom doktrinom. Deindustrijalizacija praćena finansijalizacijom predstavlja glavnu kontradikciju sistema. Posledično, javljaju se autput gep, slobodan pad konkurentnosti i visoka nezaposlenost. Pod finansijalizacijom podrazumevamo rast uticaja finansijskih tržišta, institucija i odgovarajuće elite u odnosu na privredu i državu. Glavni izazov sada predstavlja sučeljavanje neoliberalne platforme za vođenje ekonomske politike sa novom, koncepcijski složenijom platformom koja je u stanju da povrati dinamičku ravnotežu između realne ekonomije i finansijskog sektora i da prebaci ekonomiju na putanju održive zaposlenosti. Da bi se prethodno postiglo, potrebna je odvažnost donosioca odluka pri definisanju makroekonomskih i industrijskih politika. 'Pametne' industrijske politike su u centru unapređenog starog koncepta poznatog kao nova strukturna ekonomska teorija. Ekonomski sistem koji sledi novu doktrinu poznat je kao upravljani kapitalizam. U pitanju je konceptualno drugačiji sistem u odnosu na liberalni kapitalizam koji sledi neoliberalnu ekonomsku doktrinu i državni kapitalizam koji sledi doktrinu konvencionalne strukturne ekonomske teorije. Većina teorija rasta i povezanih platformi vođenja ekonomskih politika stvari posmatraju iz makroekonomske perspektive. Ova perspektiva je dobra za uočavanje odnosa između stabilnosti i rasta. To nas navodi na razmišljanje: koji institucionalni izbor podržava taj odnos? Pre Velike recesije, odgovor je dolazio sa strane monetarne politike, u načelu, i ciljanja inflacije, konkretno. Međutim, univerzalna efikasnost tržišta ne važi u situacijama većih poremećaja kao što su autput gep, deflacija i troškovima gurana inflacija. U takvim situacijama tržišne sile dovode do recesije umesto rasta očekivanja. Antikrizni program koji bazira na toj doktrini u najboljem slučaju dovodi do oporavka praćenog gubitkom radnih mesta. Učestale krize su pokazale da se određene fundamentalne pretpostavke konvencionalne ekonomske doktrine i odgovarajuće platforme za vođenje ekonomske politike moraju promeniti. Ovaj članak predstavlja kontinuitet u odnosu na naša prethodna dva doprinosa na polju tranzicije i povezanih pitanja u Srbiji [5] i [6]. Članak predstavlja nastojanje da se kreira model rasta i ekonomske politike u nemoćnoj i raštimovanoj privredi posmatrano iz perspektive privrednih subjekata. Naime, posmatrajući kontekst primarno iz mikro-ekonomske (ili poslovne) perspektive i konsultujući unapređenu platformu za vođenje ekonomskih politika, zasnovanu na aktivnoj ulozi vlade. Za to postoji opravdanje zato što je u postkriznom periodu relevantnost industrijske politike kao legitimnog institucionalnog izbora i poluge vlade prihvaćena od strane najuglednijih ekonomista i političara sa obe strane ideološkog spektra. Postoje određena pitanja koje je otvorio pomenuti zaokret. Šta je opravdanje za korekciju hipoteze o univerzalnoj efikasnosti tržišta kao fundamentalne pretpostavke ekonomske ortodoksije i priznanje mogućnosti da država može imati aktivnu ulogu u ekonomiji? Šta su ključni razlozi koji su doveli do tolikih kontroverzi u vezi sa industrijskom politikom, per se i kako ih eliminisati u izmenjenom (recimo 'pametnom') konceptu industrijske politike? Kako formulisati 'pametne' industrijske politike na način da se izbegnu pomenute slabosti, kao i da se iskoriste dokazane prednosti? Kako uskladiti ključne makro-ekonomske politike (monetarna i fiskalna) sa 'pametnim' industrijskim politikama u okviru novog (recimo 'heterodoksnog') pristupa, i sve to u slučaju Srbije. Koja su ostala važna pitanja vođenja ekonomske politike? Ovaj članak nastoji da odgovori na prethodna pitanja. Namera je da se dokaže da se u definisanju antikriznih mera kod zemalja koje imaju kašnjenje u razvoju i koje su još u tranziciji, industrijska politika predstavlja racionalan institucionalni izbor duboko utemeljen u teoriji i sa nedvosmislenim praktičnim rezultatima.
Abstract
The devastating truth that after twenty-five years of transition Serbia's economy is still impotent and out of tune opens the question: Why do people continuously act against their own interest? The answer is: the wrong system. Serbia's economy is packed with structural imbalances. Among them, the most important one is disharmony between the real economy and financial sector due to wrong transition strategy and ineffective macro management, both blindly following neo-liberal doctrine. Deindustrialization along with financialization is the main contradiction of the system. As a consequence, Serbia has experienced output gap, competitiveness freefall, and high unemployment. By financialization we mean the increase in the influence of financial markets, institutions, and elites over both the economy and the government. Now the key challenge for Serbia is to compare neo-liberal policy platform with new conceptually complex one, which is capable of restoring the dynamic balance between the real economy and financial sector and embarking the economy on the road to sustainable employment. Doing so will take courage on the part of policy makers defining both economic policies (monetary and fiscal) and industrial policies. 'Smart' industrial policies are at the center of the rejuvenated wisdom known as the new structural economics. The economic system following the new doctrine is known as managed capitalism. It is conceptually different from free-market capitalism following neo-liberal doctrine and state capitalism following conventional structural economics. Most theories of growth and related economic policy platforms were developed at the macroeconomic level. Such perspective is good for spotting relation between stability and growth. That got us thinking: What institutional choices are supporting that relationship? Prior to the Great Recession, the answer was coming from monetary policy generally and inflation targeting policy tool specifically. But, universal efficiency of the market is not common in cases of major macroeconomic distortions like output gap, deflation, and demand-pull inflation. In such situations market forces unleashed recession, instead of booming prospects. Anti- crisis measures based on the same doctrine led to jobless recovery scenario, at best. Frequent crises confirm that some fundamental assumptions of conventional economic doctrine and related economic policy platform must be revisited. This article is a continuation of our last two contributions in the field of transition and related issues in Serbia [5] and [6]. It is an attempt to create the model of growth and policy platform in an impotent and out of tune economy from the ground up. Namely, by looking at the context primarily from microeconomic (or business) perspective and following revisited conceptual economic policy platform based on active role of government. It is reasonable because in post-crisis period the relevance of industrial policy as a common sense institutional choice and the government's lever is acknowledged by mainstream economists and politicians from all sides of ideological spectrum. There are some questions triggered by this turnaround. What is the rationale for revising market efficiency as fundamental assumption of economic orthodoxy and acknowledgement of active role of government in an economy? What are the key factors that have raised so much controversies about industrial policy per se and how to fix them up in renewed (let's say 'smart') industrial policy framework? How can 'smart' industrial policies be designed to avoid past failures as well as to emulate the past benefits? How to balance core economic policies (monetary and fiscal) with 'smart' industrial policies in the new (let's say 'heterodox') economic policy approach in the case of Serbia. What is the remaining policy agenda? This article intends to address these questions. The aim is to confirm that in defining anti-crisis measures for late developer in delayed transition industrial policy is a common sense institutional choice with deep theoretical roots and unquestionable practical results.
|
|
|
|
Reference
|
|
|
Blanchard, O., DellArica, G., Mauro, P. (2010) Rethinking macroeconomic policy. Washington, IMF Staff Position note br.SPN/10/03, Feb. 12, 2010
|
|
9
|
Chang, H.J. (2003) Kicking away the ladder?: Policies and institutions for economic development in historical perspective. London: Anthem Press
|
|
|
Chenery, H.B. (1961) Comparative advantage and development policy. American Economic Review, 51,(1), 18-51
|
|
1
|
Christensen, C., Bever, D.V. (2014) The capitalist's dilemma. Harvard Business Review, 92,(6), 60-68
|
|
11  
|
Đuričin, D., Vuksanović, I. (2013) Reindustrialization strategy of Serbia: How to get it and how to use it. Ekonomika preduzeća, vol. 61, br. 5-6, str. 289-308
|
|
4
|
Đuričin, D., Vuksanović, I. (2014) How to be ahead of the curve: The role of politicians in Serbia's reindustrialization. Ekonomika preduzeća, vol. 62, br. 1-2, str. 1-20
|
|
|
Harrison, A., Rodríguez-Clare, A. (2010) Trade, Foreign Investment, and Industrial Policy for Developing Countries*. Handbook of Development Economics, str. 4039-4214
|
|
|
Hausmann, R., Klinger, B. (2006) Structural transformation and patterns of comparative advantage in the product space. u: Working Paper no. 128, Boston: Harvard University Center for international development
|
|
4
|
Hausmann, R., Rodrik, D. (2003) Economic development as self-discovery. Journal of Development Economics, 72(2), 603-33
|
|
2
|
Hidalgo, C.A., Klinger, B., Barabasi, A.-L., Hausmann, R. (2007) The Product Space Conditions the Development of Nations. Science, 317(5837): 482-487
|
|
|
Kindleberger, Ch. (1996) World economic primacy: 1500-1990. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc
|
|
2
|
Krueger, A.O. (1997) Trade policy and economic development: How we learn. American Economic Review, 87(1) 1-22
|
|
|
Krugman, P. (1979) A Model of Innovation, Technology Transfer, and the World Distribution of Income. Journal of Political Economy, 87(2): 253
|
|
4
|
Krugman, P. (2009) The return of depression economics and the crisis of 2008. New York: W.W. Norton Company Limited
|
|
|
Lim, W. (2011) Joint discovery and upgrading of comparative advantage: Lessons from Korea's development experience. u: Fardoust S., Kim Y., Sepulveda C.P. [ur.] Post crisis growth and development: A development agenda for the G-20, Washington, DC: The World Bank, pp. 173-237
|
|
2
|
Lin, J.Y. (2012) New structural economics: A framework for rethinking development and policy. Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
|
|
4
|
Lin, J., Chang, H. (2009) Should Industrial Policy in Developing Countries Conform to Comparative Advantage or Defy it? A Debate Between Justin Lin and Ha-Joon Chang. Development Policy Review, 27(5): 483-502
|
|
2
|
Lin, J.Y., Monga, C. (2010) Growth Identification And Facilitation : The Role Of The State In The Dynamics Of Structural Change. u: Policy Research Working Papers, Washington, DC: World Bank, 5313
|
|
|
Lin, J.Y., Tan, G. (1999) Policy Burdens, Accountability, and the Soft Budget Constraint. American Economic Review, 89(2): 426-431
|
|
3
|
Minsky, H.P. (2008) Stabilizing an unstable economy. McGraw-Hill
|
|
|
Monga, C. (2009) Post-macroeconomics: Reflections on the crisis and strategic directions ahead. u: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper no. 4986, Washington: World Bank
|
|
1
|
Moss, D. (2007) A concise guide to macroeconomics: What managers, executives, and students need to know. Boston: Harvard Business School Press
|
|
1
|
Mukunda, G. (2014) The price of Wall Street power: How the financial Sector's influence is undermining business. Harvard Business Review, 92,(6), 70-78
|
|
|
Noman, A., Botchwey, K., Stein, H., Stiglitz, J.E. (2011) Good Growth and Governance in AfricaRethinking Development Strategies. Oxford: Oxford University Press
|
|
|
Ohno, K. (2009) The middle income trap: Implications for industrialization strategies in East Asia and Africa. Tokyo: GRIPS Development Forum
|
|
1
|
Orhangazi, O. (2011) Review of financialization at work: Key texts and commentary. Journal of Economic Issues, XLV, 1, 247-249
|
|
|
Porter, M., Heppelmann, J. (2014) How smart connected products are transforming competition. Harvard Business Review, 92,(11), 64-88
|
|
11
|
Raghuram, R. (2010) Fault lines: How hidden fractures still threaten the world economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press
|
|
|
Rodrick, D. (2010) The global revival of industrial policy: Picking winners, saving losers. Paris: The Economist, 05/08/2010, http://www.economist.com/node/16741043
|
|
2
|
Rodrik, D. (2009) Industrial Policy: Don’t Ask Why, Ask How. Middle East Development Journal, 1(1): 1-29
|
|
20
|
Romer, P.M. (1990) Endogenous Technological Change. Journal of Political Economy, 98(S5): S71
|
|
|
Stiglitz, J., Greenwald, B. (2014) Creating a learning society: A new approach to growth, development, and social progress. New York: Columbia University Press
|
|
|
Stiglitz, J.E., Lin, J.Y., ur. (2013) The industrial policy revolution I: The role of government beyond ideology. New York: Palgrave Macmillan
|
|
2
|
Stiglitz, J.E., Lin, J.Y., Monga, C. (2013) The Rejuvenation of Industrial Policy. u: Policy Research Working Papers, Washington: World Bank
|
|
1
|
Wade, R. (1990) Governing the market. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
|
|
1
|
World Bank (1995) Bureaucrats in business: The economics and politics of government ownership. Oxford, itd: Oxford University Press / OUP
|
|
|
|
|