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2008, vol. 55, br. 1, str. 3-37
Politička ekonomija nominalnih makroekonomskih poremećaja
aNew York University, USA
bPeterson Institute for International Economics, Washington, USA + Center for Global Development, Washington, USA + Johns Hopkins University, Baltimor, USA
Ključne reči: demokratija; društvena nejednakost; nominalni makroekonomski rezultati
Sažetak
Prepoznajući da inflacija i makroekonomska politika koja na nju utiče mogu da potiču od distributivnih sukoba u društvu, mi izučavamo posredne uzroke nekoliko nominalnih poremećaja sa aspekta društvene raspodele. Razvijamo nove i koristimo široko prihvaćene postojeće instrumentalne promenljive i nalazimo da dve pojave - društvena nejednakost i demokratske institucije - imaju snažan i statistički snažan uticaj na nominalne makroekonomske ishode. S obzirom na veliku pažnju posvećenu uticaju populizma u demokratskim režimima na inflaciju, iznenađujući rezultat je da demokratske institucije snažno utiču na smanjenje inflacije u dugom roku. Snaženje demokratije za jednu standardnu devijaciju proizvodi gotovo četvorostruko smanjenje inflacije. Slično povećanje društvenih nejednakosti više nego udvostručava inflaciju. Naši rezultati su otporni na upotrebu alternativnih merila demokratije, uzoraka, uzročnih promenljivih i definicija društvene razjedinjenosti. Posebno je interesantno istaći da niz nominalnih poremećaja i njihovih neposrednih uzroka identifikovanih u makroekonomskoj literaturi, kao što su prociklična makroekonomska politika, nedostatak nezavisnosti centralne banke, "izvorni greh" i spoljna prezaduženost, imaju zajedničko poreklo u društvenim podelama i nedemokratskim političkim institucijama.
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