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Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu
2018, vol. 66, br. 4, str. 143-155
jezik rada: engleski
vrsta rada: članak
doi:10.5937/AnaliPFB1804143S

Creative Commons License 4.0
Justified epistemic authority (in legal interpretation)
(naslov ne postoji na srpskom)
Univerzitet u Beogradu, Pravni fakultet

e-adresa: bojan.spaic@ius.bg.ac.rs

Sažetak

(ne postoji na srpskom)
The paper analyzes one of the main influences on the results of legal interpretation - epistemic authority. An account of authority is given along with a distinction between two basic types of authority, followed by a brief explanation of practical authority. Epistemic authority and derivative epistemic authority in particular are explained, in order to propose the conditions under which the influence of epistemic authority on judicial interpretation is justified. The general conclusion of the paper is the following: A court or judge Y is rationally justified to defer to the ascription of meaning (interpretation) p to a legal text q of person X, if court or judge Y has good reasons to believe that X has more knowledge, skills, experience or training in ascribing meaning to (interpreting) q.

Ključne reči

Authority; Legal interpretation; Epistemic authority; Practical Authority

Reference

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