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2008, vol. 56, br. 2, str. 47-68
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Kumulativno glasanje za izbor članova uprave - II deo
Cumulative voting for election of board members: Part two
Univerzitet u Beogradu, Pravni fakultet
Sažetak
Razvoj korporativnog upravljanja je poslednjih decenija iznedrio veliki broj novih pravnih instituta, među kojima se ističe i kumulativno glasanje. Osim činjenice da je kumulativno glasanje moderna tema, o kojoj evropska teorija i praksa još uvek nisu dale konačan sud, podsticaj za pisanje ovog članka autor je pronašao i u okolnosti da je ovakav modalitet glasanja akcionara dozvoljen Zakonom o privrednim društvima, a preciziran i pojašnjen Kodeksom korporativnog upravljanja. U tom pogledu je potrebno objasniti postojeća rešenja i dati smernice društvima o poželjnim pravcima njihove implementacije, ali i ukazati na sporne aspekte u primeni kumulativnog glasanja. U prvom delu članka, objavljenom u prethodnom broju ovog časopisa, bilo je reči o pojmu, dejstvima i primeni direktnog glasanja, kao uobičajenog načina glasanja akcionara, osnovnim karakteristikama kumulativnog glasanja i pretpostavkama za njegovu primenu. Autor je u tom delu članka detaljno objasnio i način primene kumulativnog glasanja, uz naglašavanje brojnih problema koji mogu dovesti do nepravičnih i nepoželjnih ishoda. U ovom delu članka su prikazana najznačajnija ograničenja kumulativnog glasanja, među kojima se posebno izdvajaju: smanjenje broja članova uprave, ukidanje kumulativnog glasanja, jednaka podela glasova, uvođenje klasifikovane uprave, razrešenje člana uprave imenovanog od strane manjinskih akcionara i popunjavanje upražnjenih mesta u upravi. Analiza ograničenja je od velikog značaja, jer od njih zavisi domen primene i efikasnost ovakvog načina glasanja. U poslednjem delu rada biće pokazano da je kumulativno glasanje institut koji se može sa podjednakom argumentacijom napadati i braniti, zbog čega je nemoguće dati nedvosmislen zaključak u prilog opravdanosti njegovog uvođenja.
Abstract
Corporate governance has created many new legal issues in recent decades, among which cumulative voting stands out. Beside the fact that the European theory and practice still haven't made the final judgment concerning this type of voting, the major incentive for writing this paper was legal availability of this type of shareholder voting according to the Serbian Law on Business Organizations and the Serbian Corporate Governance Code. Furthermore, cumulative voting is the presumed type of voting for the election of board of directors and supervisory board in open corporations. There is apparent need to clarify these provisions, as well as to offer necessary guidelines to companies in order to properly implement rules on cumulative voting. The introduction of this article covers meaning, application and basic characteristics of straight voting, as a standard voting rule for shareholders. In the following parts of the article, the author explains the basic characteristics of cumulative voting, and conditions for its application (legal availability and type of decisions). The author emphasizes the numerous problems in cumulative voting application, which can lead to unjust and unexpected results. The following part of the article shows the most frequently used limitations of cumulative voting, such as reducing the size of the board, replacing cumulative voting with straight voting, deadlock situations, classifying the board, removing minority-elected directors without cause, and filling the vacancy on the board. The analysis of these factors is very important, because they undermine the effectiveness of cumulative voting. The last part of the article shows that arguments in favor and against cumulative voting are approximately equal, and therefore it is hard to give unequivocal conclusion in respect of justifying its introduction.
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