An overview of war events in the April 1941 war on the front towards Albania and Macedonia was based in this work on the sources and literature which make possible a more comprehensive insight into the main developments. On the basis of the presented facts can be concluded: a) that the erroneous application of the fundamental strategic ideas contained in the R^l war plan of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was one of the causes of the too rapid collapse of military forces on all the border positions, particularly on the front in Macedonia, which had a key role from the very beginning of the German invasion; b) that the defeat of the Yugoslav forces on this front was caused also by the inadequate preparations for war of the operational forces, as well as by their inadequate coordination: and c) that on the front towards Albania were underestimated and neglected factors of the irredentist propaganda and of the existence of a dense net of the Albanian and Italian intelligence services' centers which instigated the secessionist movement between the Albanians in Kosovo, Metohija and Western Macedonia so much that it annulled in a great measure the effects attained by combat units of the Kosovo and Zeta divisions, making thus possible to the German and Italian forces to quickly occupy Kosovo and Metohija.