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2010, vol. 47, br. 4-6, str. 84-95
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Regulacija menadžerske kompenzacije i preduzimanje rizika
Managerial compensation regulation and risk taking
Univerzitet u Beogradu, Pravni fakultet
Projekat: Projekat Pravnog fakulteta Univerziteta u Beogradu: Razvoj pravnog sistema Srbije i harmonizacija s pravom Evropske unije - pravni, ekonomski, politički i sociološki aspekti
Ključne reči: korporativno upravljanje; menadžerska kompenzacija; specifični humani kapital; preduzimanje rizika; regulacija menadžerske kompenzacije
Sažetak
Sve krize dosledno prati ideja da se krize rešavaju i predupređuju pooštravanjem regulacije. Ovaj rad daje teorijsku argumentaciju i empirijske nalaze koji ne podržavaju regulaciju menadžerske kompenzacije. Složeno regulatorno okruženje menja tržišna pravila igre, menja podsticaje i tako realocira rizike, troškove, koristi i proizvodi ozbiljne i skupe ekonomske i socijalne posledice koje regulator nije predvideo. Direktna regulacija menadžerske kompenzacije u finansijskom sektoru ne implicira uspostavljanje jače kontrole akcionara nad menadžerima, niti efikasno preduzimanje rizika. Zato je važno postići transparentnost odluka o vrsti i visini kompenzacije kako bi akcionari mogli da ustanove da li je menadžerska kompenzacija povezana sa preuzetim rizikom, odnosno sa donošenjem efikasnih odluka menadžera. Zato je, umesto direktne regulacije, efikasnije da akcionari imaju uvid u politiku, strukturu, visinu naknada i da o tome mogu da raspravljaju (say on pay), a ne da regulator određuje maksimalnu kompenzaciju i njenu vrstu.
Abstract
Crises are consistently followed by the idea that their solving and preventing requires strong regulation. The article presents theoretical argumentation and results of empirical studies that do not support managerial compensation regulation. Complex regulatory environment changes the rules of the game, changes incentives, realocates risk, costs, benefits and produces serious and costly economic and social consequences that were not predicted by a regulator. Direct regulation of managerial compensation in financial sector does not imply stronger shareholders' control over management, neither efficient risk taking. For these reasons, it is important to make transparent the decisions on the managerial compensation in order to allow shareholders to find out whether managerial compensation is related to efficient risk taking decisions. That is why shareholders should have insight in compensation policy, structure, level and opportunity to discuss it (say on pay) instead of regulating maximum level and structure of compensation.
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