The institutional independence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) is partly illustrated in the so-called 'autonomous concepts' developed in the Court's jurisprudence. The author tries to define and to explore main features of those autonomous concepts. Although the author notices that it is hard to provide a coherent definition, because a proper approach by legal theory is lacking, the author proposes to treat them as terms applied by the ECHR, which exist in national legal systems of Contracting Parties to the European Convention on Human Rights, but they are given a special meaning in the Court's jurisprudence. Sometimes, the meaning of those concepts as determined by the Court may differ from almost universally accepted meaning of legal notions, such as that of law, or they can lack support of comparative law, such as the case with the concept of civil rights and obligations. The author further explains that autonomous concepts are susceptible to evolution, which means that those being currently in use might be quite opposite to the old ones. Therefore, the author concludes that a practitioner who deals with jurisprudence of the ECHR must be aware of the fact that such concepts are typical products of a judge-made law. Moreover bearing in mind that the ECHR is a part of national law of its member states nowadays, national judges and practitioners must be prepared to handle with those concepts. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to provide systematic and early legal training and studies on this matter.