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2021, vol. 55, br. 1, str. 106-129
Uticaji percipiranog porekla na antimigrantska osećanja i činove društveno izazvane mržnje u Bugarskoj
Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Sofia, Bulgaria

e-adresalspasova@bas.bg
Ključne reči: socijalna distanca; antimigrantska osećanja; govor mržnje; nasilje iz mržnje
Sažetak
Ovaj rad proučava uticaje percipiranog porekla migranata na antimigrantska osećanja u bugarskom društvu, usredsređujući se na socijalnu distancu i pojedine aspekte društveno izazvane mržnje prema migrantima. Analiziraju se širenje i odobravanje govora mržnje i nasilja iz mržnje prema migrantima, kao i varijacije povezane sa percipiranim različitim okolnostima i poreklom. Kada je reč o socijalnoj distanci, izdvajaju se dva klastera - "daleki" i "bliski", na osnovu porekla, a razlike među njima nisu samo u stepenu prihvatanja, već i u rangiranju željenih uloga. Kada je reč o činovima društveno izazvane mržnje, rezultati su mnogo dvosmisleniji. Poreklo ima suštinsku ulogu u širenju govora mržnje, ali ovo nije slučaj sa rasprostranjenom (ili percipiranom) uključenošću različitih grupa u nasilje. Sklonost ka intervenciji i zaustavljanju nasilja razlikuje se prema poreklu žrtava i počinilaca, a neophodno je dalje proučavanje da bi se prepoznale determinante.

Introduction

Two main lines of theorizing and analysis can be distinguished with respect to sources of anti-immigrant sentiments, according to which they are to be attributed to economical (O’Rourke & Sinnott, 2006; Dustmann & Preston, 2007) or cultural (Davidov & Meuleman, 2012; Billiet & De Witte, 1995; Ceobanu & Escandell, 2008) confrontation. Most of the papers arguing that anti-immigrant sentiments are due to cultural confrontation assume, implicitly or explicitly, that symbolic concerns and anticipated sociotropic effects (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014) are related to perceptions of the otherness of the immigrants in terms of values, religion, culture, ethnicity, race, etc. (Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2015; Gorodzeisky, 2013; Scheepers, Gijsberts, Coenders, 2002).There is however, little research on the way specific cleavages of difference and perceived forms of otherness affect anti-immigrant sentiments and in particular on the effects of perceptions of origin of different groups on the concrete sentiments towards them (some notable recent exceptions being: Blinder & Markaki, 2018; Heath & Richards, 2019). Studies on the effects of perceived origin on anti-immigrant hate speech, hate crimes and hate motivated violence are even scarce.

The paper tries to fill this gap by analyzing the effects of the perceived immigrant's origin on anti-immigrant sentiments in Bulgaria measurable through social distancing towards different immigrant groups and through manifestations of socially induced hatred.

The paper contributes as well with analysis of the spread and acceptance of anti-immigrant hate speech and hate motivated violence.

The study is part of a larger research, funded by the Bulgarian Science Fund, and draws on data from a set of representative surveys on attitudes of Bulgarians towards immigrants and refugees at the peak and after the wave of intensified migration.

The paper is structured as follows: the first part introduces the main theoretical notions and concepts; after that the second present the methodology of the empirical study; the third part presents the data and results of the research; finally, the last part concludes with an overview of the most important findings and some notes on possible future research.

Theoretical framework

Studies focused on sources and consequences of anti-immigrant sentiments are abundant, however rarely comprehensive (Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010; Gorodzeisky, 2013). There are two main lines of theorizing and analysis, which only seldom and only recently overlap (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; Gorodzeisky, 2013). The first line of inquiry is grounded in political economy and is concerned with economic self-interest or collective economic interest like labor market competition and fiscal burden (O’Rourke & Sinnott, 2006; Dustmann & Preston, 2007). The second – sociopsychological – suggests sources of anti-immigrant attitudes are to be found in the perceptions of a sociotropic effect (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014) on the host country and society. Studies in this paradigm are much more heterogeneous and study a variety of factors such as identities and values (Davidov & Meuleman, 2012; Billiet & De Witte 1995), nationalism (Ceobanu & Escandell, 2008), perceived threat (Scheepers et al., 2002). Despite abundant research, there is little proof that anti-immigrant attitudes are based on the real or anticipated effects on the personal economic situations. More consistently, recent research shows that attitudes towards immigrants are "mostly driven by symbolic concerns about the nation as a whole” (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014, p. 227) or by “concerns over the conditions or characteristics of the immigrant population” (Markaki, Longhi, 2013, p. 332).

Dustmann and Preston (2007) present evidence that racial or cultural prejudice is an important component to attitudes towards immigration when it comes to immigration from countries with ethnically different populations.

Similarly, according to Gorodzeisky and Semyonov (2009) anti-immigrant sentiments, and specifically exclusionary attitudes, can be formed on grounds of national origin or national membership and on grounds of race and ethnicity. The first type is directed "'indiscriminately' at all non-nationals (or 'foreigners') regardless of their race or ethnicity" and the second is "directed 'selectively' only at non-European ethnic and racial minorities" (Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2009, p. 416). The two authors argue that Europeans are more willing to endorse exclusion of immigrants of non-European origin than immigrants of European origin. This thesis is further developed developed by Gorodzeisky and Semyonov (2015), according to which ethnic and racial prejudices toward non-European/non-White minorities and competitive threat (both at individual and country levels) are two independent sources of attitudes toward all immigrants, i.e. prejudiced attitude serves both as surplus to perception of threat and as independent factor for anti-immigrant sentiments. What is more, according to them, "racial prejudice toward non-White/non-Europeans should be seen as an independent (and additive) source of negative attitudes toward immigrants in general" (Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2015, p. 20).

As suggested by Gorodzeisky in another line of research (Gorodzeisky, 2011) not only ethnical or racial prejudice form anti-immigrant sentiments, but also perceptions of the economic conditions in the country of origin. Using data from the first round of the ESS and cross-referencing attitudes towards immigrants from poorer versus richer countries in Europe, she identifies four categories of attitudes: pro-admissionists, total exclusionists, poor country exclusionists, rich country exclusionists). According to Gorodzeisky (2011), exclusionary views directed exclusively at foreigners from 'poorer countries in Europe' or at foreigners 'from richer countries in Europe' are quite substantial, although the majority of people do not distinguish. Similarly, Blinder & Markaki (2018) found evidence that both economic conditions in the country of origin and origin from within or out of EU and can play a role in attitude towards immigrants. In their conclusions the two authors go further than Gorodzeisky, arguing that the economic conditions in the country of origin are much more important for anti-immigrant sentiments than European or non-European origin.

In a recent article Heath and Richards (2019) present evidence that there is considerable over-time stability in the attitudes towards immigrants and sentiments towards different groups of immigrants. According to them, immigrants "of the same racial or ethnic group as the majority are preferred to those from a different ethnic group or those from poorer countries in Europe, who in turn are slightly preferred to those from poorer countries outside Europe" (Heath & Richards, 2019, p. 17). The two authors as well conclude that there are more negative attitudes towards Muslim migrants and the least desired are migrants with Roma origin.

With regards to anti-immigrant prejudice, earlier works of Pettigrew (Pettigrew, 1998) argue that waves of intensified migration led to increased prejudice, direct and indirect discrimination, political opposition, and extensive violence to immigrants and immigrant minorities.

Building on the previous findings on hate crimes and hate speech (Spasova, 2019) the current study assumes that the main factor for aggression and violence in intergroup relations and in particular the ones targeted at immigrants, are precisely prejudices-distorted categorizations of social groups. Prejudice is understood as a "negative assessment of a social group or a negative assessment of a particular individual that is based on his/her group affiliation" (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003: 414), which is spread through culture and internalized through experience (e.g. Dunham, Chen, Banaji, 2013).

Acts of hatred – hate motivated violence, hate crimes and hate speech, are deviant acts, motivated by prejudice, which serve to further confirm the prejudices of the group with which the perpetrators identify. Following Allport's classical understanding, hate here refers to a complex mental phenomenon representing a "permanent organization of aggressive impulses to a person or group of people" that is a difficult structure in the mental and emotional life of the individual (Allport, 1979: 363). In this sense, hatred is stable over time – sentiment, not emotion or affect, and yet more or less passive, but driving impulse associated with the behaviour. Hatred is what acts as a "motivating force for violence" (Kressel, 2002).

It is important to point that hatred does not have to be the main motive for a criminal or violent act in order for that act to be classified as manifestation of socially induced hatred. As other researchers point out (McDevitt, Levin, Bennett, 2002; Perry, 2009; Walters, 2011),even when hatred is not the main motive for a particular criminal act, it can still play a significant role in overall motivation, for example in choosing a victim. Similar is the difference described by Herek, Berrill and Berrill (1992) between "expressive" and "evaluative" hate-motivated attacks: expressive violence aims to destroy or harm the victim because of his/her identity and belonging to a certain group, and evaluative violence is directed to the specific victim due to its perception as an obvious goal.

Although hate speech is not necessarily violent in itself, a number of studies have unambiguously linked the use of hate speech to the triggering of violence (e.g. Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014; Benesh, 2012). The term includes incitement to violence, radicalism and genocide, which constitutes a crime according to the law, as well as insults and qualifications based on identification and belonging to a certain group, which in itself is not criminalized. The study uses a definition of hate speech, according to which these are "forms of expression that disseminate, incite, facilitate or justify harm (specifically, discrimination, hostility or violence) based on the victim's social or demographic affiliation to a group”.

Essential for understanding the effects of hate speech are studies of the so-called "dangerous speech” (Benesh, 2012) and "language of fear" (Buyse, 2014), which emphasize the frequency of use and the speakers of hate – whether they are officials, journalists or ordinary citizens. According to research on media content preceding acts of genocide, the use of hate speech by officials or in the official media is key to objectifying hatred and radicalism into violence (Benesh, 2012; Leader Maynard & Benesch, 2016).

Research methodology

Empirical data are collected via a series of PAPI (Pen-and-paper assisted personal interviews) studies with a structured questionnaire. The information mainly used in the analysis is from the last survey which was conducted in the period September-October 2019, as already mentioned – after the depletion of the massive inflow of migrants from third countries. For comparison on several occasions in the analysis data from the wave conducted in November-December 2017 is used. Taking into consideration the importance of spatial and psychological proximity and distance (Liberman & Chaiken, 1996), both studies are designed as a two-stage nested sample and use a sample model that is nationally representative for the adult population. The samples are random stratified with a volume of 840 individuals in 2019 and 800 individuals in 2017. The stratification is according to NUTS 2 by the size of the settlement. The settlements are grouped in six groups and the sample excludes settlements with less than one hundred people (which is 1% of the general population). The nests are 80 with ten interviews per nest. The source of information for the sampling plans in both surveys is the 2011 census – the breakdown by age groups for each settlement. The stochastic error at 50% is estimated to be ±3,5%. Data are weighted by sex and age.

To study anti-immigrant sentiments, the study employs an adapted variant of the Bogardus social scale (Bogardus, 1959). Inspired by Simmel’s ideas on geometry of social life (Wark & Galliher, 2007), Bogardus devised a scale intended to measure prejudice and to "reduce rationalizing...as much as possible" (1959, p. 30). The original scale is elegantly simple and consists of seven roles with an increasing level of social proximity and closer contact. Respondents are asked to select the closest degree of intimacy that they find suitable for representatives of certain ethnic groups. In the current study four of the degrees of proximity of the Bogardus social distance scale are used-immediate neighbour, direct supervisor or employer, married to a close relative, close friend. The social distance scale is modified using a Likert-type scale with four response categories for each separate role, thus turning the cumulative Bogardus scale into a set of separate questions with unidimensional scale.

Manifestations of socially induced hatred – hate speech and hate violence – are studied with questions for experience, for opinion and with a battery of original projective questions, specially developed for the research. The projective questions are designed to suggest responses describing the alleged behaviour of the respondents in various situations of immigrants/foreigners related violence, defined solely by the origin of the victims and attackers.

Results

With respect to social distance and acceptance, despite small variations, immigrants with different origin can be grouped into two clusters with similar in-group results and significant difference from each. The first cluster includes immigrants that are accepted more and easily and thus can be labeled "close immigrants". Those are immigrants from ethnic Bulgarian descent born and raised outside of the country and other Europeans from countries in or out of the EU. The second cluster includes immigrants that are accepted less, especially with the increase of social proximity, and can be labeled "distant immigrants". This cluster includes immigrants from Africa, the Middle East (Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.) and China (Figure 1).

Figure 1 Social distance index (100 – complete acceptance by all, 0 – complete estrangement by all)
Графикон 1
Индекс социјалне дистанце (100 – потпуно прихватање од свих, 0 – потпуно одбацивање од свих)

Approximately one third of Bulgarians would feel completely comfortable if their immediate neighbour is someone from the "close immigrants" – a European from outside the EU (34%) or ethnic Bulgarian from another country (31%), and one third (32% and 33% respectively), would feel some degree of uncomfortably. For the immigrants from Africa and the Middle East proximately two thirds say they would feel uncomfortable (31% – "completely uncomfortable" and 31% "somewhat uncomfortable" for a person from the Middle East and 34% "completely uncomfortable" and 29% "somewhat uncomfortable" for a person from Africa). Only 9% and 8% of Bulgarians, respectively, would feel completely comfortable if their neighbour is someone from Africa or the Middle East.

Regarding direct supervisor or employer, 25% of Bulgarians state they would be completely comfortable if a European from outside EU or an ethnic Bulgarian from another country is on that position and 36% – that they would feel uncomfortable (16% – "completely uncomfortable" and 20% "somewhat uncomfortable" for an ethnic Bulgarian and 15% "completely uncomfortable" and 21% "somewhat uncomfortable" for European from outside EU) if this is the case. As in other positions, the acceptance of the other three groups is significantly lower. Least comfortable Bulgarians would feel if their direct supervisor is a person from the Middle East as this hypothetical situation would be completely comfortable only for 10%, somewhat uncomfortable for 24% and completely uncomfortable for 31%.

The distribution of the social distance preferences towards different groups of immigrants for the position of a close relative by marriage displays even more pronounced differences between the two clusters and almost identical result for the groups in each of them. 29% of Bulgarians would feel completely comfortable if they become relatives by marriage with someone from the group of the close immigrants, whereas only 7% (or 6% for Africa) would feel this way in the same situation but with a person from the group of distant migrants. Albeit with a minimal difference, the people from Africa are least desired – 20% have indicated that for them origin doesn't matter, 6% would feel completely comfortable, 23% – somewhat uncomfortable and 50% – completely uncomfortable.

It is important to note that for all levels of proximity there are differences with regard to the stated irrelevance of the origin. For example, on the kinship by marriage where the discrepancy is biggest, 31% of the respondents have stated this for immigrants from a European descent, 29% – for an ethnic Bulgarian from another country, 22% – for immigrants coming from the Middle East and 20% – for immigrants from Africa. Such a discrepancy should not exist, if, as the answer suggests, in reality the origin of the relatives by marriage is irrelevant. A possible explanation would be the existence of a certain degree of social desirability in these responses, which, however, does not work well enough for the distant immigrants.

A social distance index that reflects the level of comfort was created to enable a comparison that includes both the tested migrant groups and the tested social roles. The index was created by assigning weight to the different levels of comfortability and takes values between 0 and 100 where 0 means completely uncomfortable for everyone, and 100 – completely comfortable or origin is irrelevant for everyone. The index reveals several rather interesting results. It is somewhat surprising to note that for the above discussed positions ethnic Bulgarians from another country are less desirable than other Europeans. As it will be seen in the analysis below however this is not the case for the position of close friend. Further, for the group of closer immigrants, the most accepted role is the one of an immediate neighbour, while for the group of distant immigrants the most accepted role is that of direct employer. This difference is another important cleavage in the clustering of the groups of immigrants as close and distant.

For the next tested role – the one of a close friend, most accepted by Bulgarians are the ethnic Bulgarians from another country with 78% of the respondents willing to accept them. Europeans from a third country come to a second place with 71% willing to accept them. Immigrants from the Middle East, Africa and China are, as expected, considerably less accepted. A person from China would be accepted as a close friend by 44%, a person from the Middle East – by 38%, a person from Africa – by 35%.

Though the social distance for this role is quite high, especially for the cluster of distant immigrants, a comparison with data from 2017 shows a probable increase in the level of acceptance. Methodological considerations should be kept in mind, concerned with the fact that in 2017 acceptance was not tested for different groups but for all immigrants at large. Data show that in 2017 – much closer to the peak of the migrant inflow, only 23% would accept an immigrant, regardless of origin, as their close friend. In 2019 acceptance is several times higher for the close immigrants and much higher even for the distant immigrants. A possible explanation for these results is the reduced sensitivity towards the topic due the decrease in the migrant inflow that, one might argue, is linked to reduced perception of potential threat and the lessening of social panics.

Furthermore, the results on the assessment of hate speech prevalence allow some very interesting observations.

According to the respondents, statements containing insulting qualifications (the respondents are given the freedom to decide for themselves what qualifies as an insulting statement) are most commonly against immigrants from Africa and the Middle East. 21% say they have heard such statements often, 40% – rather rarely and 39% – never. Next in prevalence are such statements against immigrants from China, followed by statements against immigrants of Bulgarian origin from other countries and statements against citizens of other European countries. Most rarely respondents have heard insulting statements against immigrants from third European countries – 5% have heard such statements often, 30% – rather rarely and 65% – never.

Quite similar, but with much lower values, is the distribution of the prevalence of the more serious type of hate speech – those containing threats and aggression (again, respondents are given the freedom to decide for themselves what qualifies as threats and verbal aggression). According to the results, such statements against immigrants from Africa and the Middle East are again the most common, but here 9% have often heard such statements, 27% have rarely heard them and never 64%. As insulting statements, statements containing threats and aggression against immigrants from third European countries are most rare – 3% have heard such statements often, 19% – rather rarely and 78% – never.

To enable a comparison simultaneously of both types of hate statements for all immigrant groups an index of hate speech was created by assigning weight to the three variables in the scale for distribution assessment. The index takes values between 0 and 100 where 0 means that none ever heard such statements and 100 – that everyone estimates such statements as rather common (Figure 2).

Figure 2 Spread of anti-immigrant hate speech according to origin (index)
Графикон 2
Ширење антимигрантског говора мржње према пореклу (индекс)

As visible from the index, the difference between the distribution of statements containing offensive qualifications and those containing threats and aggression is in the level rather than in the proportions. This applies both to the ratios within each group of immigrants and to the ratios between the different groups. The similar distributions suggest a hypothesis that there is a relation between the two groups of statements, which hypothesis is supported by the correlation analysis. The results show that there is a statistically significant association between the respondents' assessments of the degree of prevalence of the two types of statements, with the values being highest when both statements are related to the same group of immigrants. For example, for immigrants from third European countries, who according to the respondents are subjected to both statements containing insults and statements containing threats and aggression to the smallest degree, the correlation values are: Appr. Significance = 0.000; Cramer's V = 0.541. For the immigrants from Africa and the Middle East, most commonly subjected to both types of hate statements, these values are: Appr. Significance = 0.000; Cramer's V = 0.487.

With regard to dangerous speech-anti-immigrant and anti-refugee hate speech by public figures – according to the data of the current survey, 11% of Bulgarians accept the use of offensive phrases by politicians, 10% – by journalists, 22% consider acceptable the use of hate speech by ordinary people, and 15% – by themselves (Figure 3).

Figure 3 Hate speech and dangerous speech acceptance
Графикон 3
Прихватање говора мржње и опасног говора

In terms of proportion, this distribution corresponds to the results of 2017, although there has since been a significant decline in the overall level of acceptance. To an identical question in 2017, 19.2% of respondents indicated that they accept the use of hate speech and insulting phrases by politicians, 20.1% – by journalists, 44.1% – by ordinary people, and 35.6% by themselves.

Although the sample does not allow observations and conclusions on the level of hate crime victimization or hate crime offending of immigrants, the results connected to eyewitness experience of aggressive behaviour and acts of violence provide some information. A relatively small proportion of the respondents report having witnessed aggressive behaviour by or against foreigners and immigrants, with aggressive acts perpetrated by immigrants generally being less than those against them. 7% have witnessed aggressive behaviour by citizens of other EU countries, immigrants from third European countries and immigrants from the Middle East and Africa and 4% – by immigrants from Asia. Instances of aggressive behaviour targeted at citizens of other EU countries have been seen by 12% of the respondents. 8% report having seen aggression targeted at immigrants from the Middle East and Africa, 7% – at immigrants from third European countries and 5% – at immigrants from Asia.

Results from the projective questions, show that acceptance and approval of anti-immigrant violence is much higher than the reported incidents of violence. In an imaginary situation of violence against immigrants, and it should be emphasized that the victim is defined only on this basis, 80% of respondents agree that violence is never justified but 20% are of the option that "immigrants are guilty – they had to stay where they are from". The data unequivocally show a high degree of normalization of acts of physical violence and hate crimes, moreover, that the results of 2017 are exactly the same, i.e. this attitude is stable over time.

The set of projective questions on the presumptive reactions of the respondents in situations of violence also show a strong influence of prejudice against members of outgroups. Although a situation specifically with immigrants has been not tested, results are important for understanding attitudes towards different groups of immigrants. In the general case – a situation of violence that is not defined in any way, 13% of Bulgarians assess the likelihood of intervening to stop the violence as very high, 32% are likely to intervene to some extent, 29% – to a small extent and 27% would not intervene at all. In situations where the victims are of Bulgarian origin and the perpetrators belong to various outgroups, the willingness and likelihood of intervention to stop the violence is close (within the margin of error) to that in the general situation. Although with a small difference, it is interesting to note that in the case of attackers from another ethnicity and in the case of attackers from another race the percentage of people who think they would most likely react is higher. In case of attackers from another ethnicity 14% assess the likelihood of interfering as very high and 28% – as nonexistent, and in case of attacker from another race – 15% assess the likelihood of interfering as very high and 27% – as nonexistent. In situations where the positions are reversed and Bulgarians are the perpetrators, and the victims are members of out-groups, the willingness to intervene is lower than in the general case. For example, in a situation in which the victims are of another race or another ethnicity, 8% are likely to intervene to a very large extent, and 31% would not react at all. With victims of another religion those percentages are 8% and 32% respectively and with victims of foreign origin – 7% and 32%.

The differences in the attitude and likelihood of reactions in the different situations are clearly seen from the index chart created by assigning weight to the various degrees of likelihood (Figure 4).

Figure 4 Hate speech and dangerous speech acceptance
Графикон 4
Прихватање говора мржње и опасног говора

The index takes values between 0 and 100 where 0 means that no one will react and intervene and 100 – that everyone estimates the likelihood of intervening as very high.

Discussion and conclusion

The study shows that perceived origin has a significant effect on anti-immigrant sentiments in Bulgaria both is terms of social distancing towards different immigrant groups and in terms of manifestations and acceptance of acts of socially induced hatred.

With respect to social distancing and acceptance of immigrant, two clusters are differentiated – "distant" and "close", as the distinction between the two is not only in the levels of acceptance, but also in the differing ranking of roles according to acceptance preferences. The differences in the ranking of roles indicate that the roles are not necessarily monovalent in terms of social distance and is an important indicator for attribution of immigrant groups to the two clusters.

Although in general it seems that immigrants in the "distant" cluster as a rule originate from countries that are more distant in terms of geography or culture and those in the "close" come from countries that are closer, social distance is not direct reflection of geographical or cultural distance. For example, the results evidence that people from China are generally more preferred than people from the Middle East for almost all social roles, although the latter are closer both culturally and geographically. Furthermore, contrary to expectations, ethnic Bulgarians living in another country, who are supposedly closest in terms of culture, are not the most preferred group for three out of four tested positions. Further research is needed to deepen the understanding of these results and establish possible explanations.

With regard to spread and acceptance of acts motivated by socially induced hatred, perceived origin of immigrants has substantial effects, although results are much more ambiguous. Spread of hate speech vary for immigrants of different origin and groups cannot be clustered. Spread and acceptance of hate speech do not exhibit dangerous trends, as acceptance of statements containing aggression and threats, is lower than acceptance of statements containing insults, and dangerous speech is less accepted hate speech used by ordinary people.

A relatively small proportion of respondents report having witnessed acts of violence in which immigrants or foreigners are involved – either as victims or perpetrators. Nevertheless, results show that, on the whole, immigrants and foreigners are (considered) more often the victims of violence than the perpetrators. Again, there is no ground for clustering different groups with respect to involvement in violence.

There are differences in the inclination to intervene and stop violence dependent on the roles and origin of victims and perpetrators. However, the association of inclination to react in different situations is very strong with the principal inclination and further study is needed to identify strongest determinants.

Comparisons with data from previous years reveal some contradictory data. While there is a marked decline in anti-immigrant sentiments in terms of social distance and approval of anti-immigrant hate speech, the approval of anti-immigrant acts of violence has remained stable over time. Further research in the next years is needed to study whether those results are a random variation, a temporary phenomenon or a trend and in fact – a shift in anti-immigrant sentiments.

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Scheepers, P., Gijsberts, M., & Coenders, M. (2002). Ethnic exclusionism in European countries: Public opposition to civil rights for legal migrants as a response to perceived ethnic threat. Eur Sociol Rev, 18(1), 17-34. [Crossref]
Spasova, L. (2019). Hate crime: Mechanisms for normalization of socially induced hatred. Sofia: Avangard Prima. p. 313 [in Bulgarian].
Walters, M.A. (2011). A general theories of hate crime?: Strain, doing difference and self control. Critical Criminology, 19(4), 313-330. [Crossref]
Wark, C., & Galliher, J.F. (2007). Emory Bogardus and the origins of the social distance scale. American Sociologist, 38(4), 383-395. [Crossref]
Yanagizawa-Drott, D. (2014). Propaganda and conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan genocide. Q J Econ, 129(4), 1947-1994.a. [Crossref]
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Mcdevitt, J., Levin, J., Bennett, S. (2002) Hate crime offenders: An expanded typology. Journal of Social Issues, 58(2): 303-317
O'Rourke, K.H., Sinnott, R. (2006) The determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration. European Journal of Political Economy, 22(4): 838-861
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Walters, M.A. (2011) A general theories of hate crime?: Strain, doing difference and self control. Critical Criminology, 19(4): 313-330
Wark, C., Galliher, J.F. (2007) Emory Bogardus and the origins of the social distance scale. American Sociologist, 38(4): 383-395
Yanagizawa-Drott, D. (2014) Propaganda and conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan genocide. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(4): 1947-1994.a
 

O članku

jezik rada: srpski, engleski
vrsta rada: izvorni naučni članak
DOI: 10.5937/socpreg55-30305
primljen: 13.01.2021.
revidiran: 17.03.2021.
prihvaćen: 17.03.2021.
objavljen u SCIndeksu: 16.04.2021.
metod recenzije: dvostruko anoniman
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