Corporate management: Ownership, control and shareholders' rights

Đorđević, Marija

doi:10.2298/PRIZ0504211D

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Privredna izgradnja

2005, vol. 48, br. 3-4, str. 211-229

Korporativno upravljanje - vlasništvo, kontrola i prava akcionara

Đorđević Marija

Ključne reči: korporativno upravljanje; vlasništvo; kontrola; prava akcionara

Sažetak

Bez obzira na stepen razvoja ekonomije u kojoj posluje, svaka korporacija se sreće sa istim problemima u vezi sa korporativnim upravljanjem. Ti problemi su: vlasništvo, prava akcionara i kontrola. Vlasništvo se stiče kupovinom akcija kompanije. Povezano je sa donošenjem esencijalnih odluka u korporaciji kao što su: izmena statuta firme, nova emisija akcija, etc. Prisutna su dva tipa vlasništva: disperzovano vlasništvo i koncentrisano vlasništvo. Disperzovano vlasništvo je karakteristično za anglosaksonske zemlje (UK i SAD) gde je zastupljen jednomodni sistem korporativnog upravljanja. Ovaj tip vlasništva se odlikuje paketima akcija manjim od 20%. Sa druge strane, koncentrisano vlasništvo pretpostavlja postojanje većinskog akcionara koji ima vise od 20% akcija kompanije. Ukoliko pojedinačni akcionar poseduje vise od 50% kompanije onda je on većinski akcionar i ima kontrolu nad kompanijom. Ovaj tip vlasništva je karakteristika kontinentalne Evrope i Japana, gde je prisutan dvomodni sistem upravljanja kompanijom. Prava akcionara moraju biti garantovana zakonom i drugim institucionalnim pravilima, kao što su pravila koja publikuju berze za kompanije sa svog listinga. Danas svaka država prihvata OECD-ove Principe korporativnog upravljanja. Štaviše, tranzicione ekonomije, kao što je Rusija, moraju pored toga izglasati i poštovati zakone koji štite prava akcionara. Kontrola menadžmenta je jedan od načina da se zaštite prava akcionara. Može biti interna i eksterna. Nadzorni odbor je glavni deo interne kontrole. Eksternu kontrolu obavljaju nezavisni eksterni revizori koji su sa korporacijom povezani ugovorom o pružanju usluga. Važno je istaći da i interni i eksterni revizori moraju biti nezavisni od menadžmenta preduzeća. U ovom radu pokušali smo da predočimo probleme savremenog korporativnog upravljanja kao sto su vlasništvo, kontrola i prava akcionara.

Abstract

In spite of extent of economy development in one country, every corporation faces up with same problems connected with corporate governance. Problems are ownership, shareholders rights and control. The way to acquire ownership is by buying shares of company. Ownership is connected with making essential decisions in corporation like changing statute of firm, allowing new stock market flotation, etc. There are two types of ownership: widespread or dispersed ownership and concentrated ownership. Dispersed ownership is characteristic of Anglo-Saxon countries (United Kingdom and United States) where one-tier system is representative model of corporate governance. Dispersed ownership means that every single packet of shares is smaller than 20% of total shares in corporation. On the other hand concentrated ownership characterizes presence of ultimate owner(s) in company. Ultimate owner is person who holds more than 20% of shares in firm. If shareholder holds more than 50% of shares he is major shareholder what means that he has control over company. Concentrated ownership is characteristic of continental Europe and Japan where is presented two-tier model of corporate governance. Law and other institutional rules, like rules for listed companies of stock market, must guarantee the shareholder rights. Today, every country accepts Principles of Corporate Governance published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Further more, the transitional countries, as Russia, must pass and respect laws, which protect shareholders rights. Control of management is one of the ways to protect shareholder rights. Control could be internal and external. Audit or Supervisory board is main part of internal control. Independent external auditor who is in relation with company does external control by contract of giving services. It is important that all auditors (internal of external) be independent of management of corporations. In this paper, we try to adduce main problems of modern corporate governance as ownership control and shareholders rights.

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O članku

jezik rada: srpski
vrsta rada: naučni članak
DOI: 10.2298/PRIZ0504211D
objavljen u SCIndeksu: 02.06.2007.

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