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2015, vol. 9, br. 1, str. 9-34
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Filipsova kriva u ekonomici blagostanja i teoriji igara
Phillips curve in welfare economics and game theory
Sažetak
Filipsova kriva kao međuzavisnost inflacije i nezaposlenosti postala je veoma moćno analitičko oruđe ekonomske politike i makroekonomske teorije. Nastala znamenitim člankom A. Filipsa krajem 50tih godina, nalazila je sve širu primenu u makroekonomskim modelima i praktičnim izborima ekonomske politike, u sučeljavanju sa dva najvažnija oblika makro-neravnoteže: inflacijom i nezaposlenosti. Stoga se pokazalo da se može upotrebiti u kontekstu Pareto-optimuma i funkcije društvenog blagostanja, kao i u teoriji igara i međunarodnoj koordinaciji ekonomske politike. Predmet rada je analiza Filipsove krive u okviru modela teorije igara i ekonomike blagostanja (kao izbor između različitih nivoa inflacije i nezaposlenosti), a cilj rada da pokaže kako je moguće teorijski i praktično, povezati ovaj moćan instrument ekonomske politike sa važnim teorijskim konceptima u ekonomskoj nauci i sa novijim intelektualnim dostignućima kakvo je teorija igara.
Abstract
Phillips curve as the interdependence between inflation and unemployment has become a very powerful analytical tool of economic policy and macroeconomic theory. Created in the famous article by A. Phillips in the late 50s, it has been increasingly implemented in macroeconomic models and practical choices of economic policy, dealing with the two most important forms of macro imbalance: inflation and unemployment. Therefore, it has become obvious that it can be used in the context of Pareto-optimum and social welfare function, as well as in the game theory and international economic policy coordination. The paper analyzes Phillips curves in the game theory and welfare economics framework (as a choice between the different inflation and unemployment rates), and aims to demonstrate theoretically and practically that it is possible to connect this powerful instrument of economic policy with important theoretical concepts in economics and recent intellectual achievements of the game theory.
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