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2004, vol. 56, br. 3, str. 45-75
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Terorizam i organizovani kriminal posle 11. septembra 2001. godine
Terrorism and organized crime in the wake of September 11, 2001
Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd
Sažetak
U teoriji je napravljena razlika između klasičnog terorizma i mega-terorizma koji je obeležio razdoblje posle terorističkih udara na Njujork i Vašington 11. septembra 2001. godine. Dok klasični terorizam teži da bude dopuna politike, odnosno da se manifestuje kao njen kriminalizovani produžetak mega-terorizam je kvalitativno nova pojava koja je sama po sebi politika. Uslovi za mega-terorizam povezani su s visokim ulozima i velikom disproporcijom u sili kojom pojedine strane raspolažu. Politika SAD najviše je doprinela stvaranju takvih uslova na globalnom planu, i one su za to strateški odgovorne, što često ne shvataju ili ne žele da shvate ni najizrazitiji kritičari međunarodnog hegemonizma u politici Sjedinjenih Država. Agresivno ponašanje velike sile u međunarodnim odnosima gotovo automatski proizvodi još veći broj antagonizovanih odnosa drugih manjih sila a sve to dovodi do opšteg zaoštravanja međunarodnih odnosa. Vojni odgovori na mega-terorističku pretnju upravo proizvode njenu eskalaciju, odnosno preterano agresivni odgovori na klasične terorističke pretnje delimično su i izazvali mega-terorizam. Najveća greška u odgovoru na mega-terorizam (SAD, ali i drugih uticajnih sila) jeste prihvatanje ratujućeg modela vojne agresije, što teroristima pribavlja legitimitet koji ranije nisu imali. Pojave korupcionaških afera u Srbiji i Crnoj Gori, u Makedoniji, u BiH i drugim zemljama Balkana samo dodatno potvrđuju da su procesi tranzicije u većini zemalja Jugoistočne, pa i Istočne Evrope, praćeni nus proizvodima u obliku kriminalizacije ekonomskih i političkih sistema, pa se pojavljuju ozbiljni problemi u raspodeli moći u balkanskim tranzicijama. U strukturi novoformirane demokratije, koja je u saglasju sa savremenim tendencijama u razvoju tzv. poliarhične demokratije, političke odluke ne donose uvek i nužno političke institucije kao predstavnici države, iako se one donose u okviru tih institucija. Javna politika se odvaja od javnog mnjenja i pojavljuje se hronični deficit legitimnosti vlasti. U delovima političkog establišmenta, povezanim sa organizovanim kriminalom, stvara se atmosfera da "cilj opravdava sredstvo" ili "da je sve dopušteno, što nije izričito zabranjeno", što pogoduje stvaranju uslova za legitimisanje korupcije i organizovanog kriminala. Iskazana destruktivna uloga organizovanih kriminalnih grupa, odnos aktuelnih vlasti, pa i dela javnosti prema tim grupama u vreme međunacionalnih sukoba, i dalje, učinili su dovoljno jasnom činjenicu da se veze između organizovanog kriminala i političkih elita u svim delovima bivše SFR Jugoslavije ostvaruju putem uzajamnih klijentelističkih odnosa, koje su pothranjivali i međunarodni činioci svojim nedoslednim ponašanjem. Nedoslednost međunarodne podrške doprinosi stvaranju klijentelskih kultura, a takve kulture dovode do formiranja relativno trajnih partnerstava između političkih elita i organizovanog kriminala. Tako nastaje novi tip organizovanog kriminala koji zadržava klasično svojstvo (kriminal za profit), ali se i modifikuje u "novi ratujući entitet", koji se okreće i borbi protiv države radi preuzimanja državne vlasti. Osnovni problem sa legitimacijom nasilja u međunarodnim odnosima jeste to što se njome legitimiše i teroristički odgovor na monopolizaciju međunarodnih odnosa i na tzv. intervencionističke ratove. Sadašnja tendencija u SAD ka relegitimaciji nasilja kao metoda borbe protiv terorizma istorijski i bezbednosno je retrogradan. Time se samo smanjuje stigma terorizma u svetu i povećava prostor za argumentaciju da "teroristi nemaju izbora". Isto ili slično važi i za organizovani kriminal u Srbiji ili ma kojoj zemlji u tranziciji u Jugoistočnoj Evropi. Osnovni princip uspešnog suprotstavljanja terorizmu smatra autor, jeste održavanje moralnog statusa nenasilja kao imperativa za međunarodne odnose. Savremena politika, pre svega globalna politika SAD koja je upravo zasnovana na ponovnoj legitimaciji nasilja, unapred je osuđena na neuspeh u borbi protiv terorizma.
Abstract
The theory differentiates between classical terrorism and mega terrorism that has marked the period of time after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, against New York and Washington. While the classic terror seeks to supplement politics, and to be manifested as its criminalized projection, the mega terrorism is a qualitatively new phenomenon which itself is a policy. The mega terrorism is about high stakes and high disproportion of power possessed by particular parties. The US policy has contributed most to creating such conditions globally, and the United States is strategically responsible for it. For the most part, this is not or will not even be realized by the most prominent critics of international hegemony in the United States policy. Aggressive stance of the great power in international relations almost automatically instigates even greater number of antagonistic responses of other smaller powers, which all leads to more strained international relations. Military responses to mega terrorist threat have exactly caused its escalation, that is to say too aggressive responses to classical terrorist threats have partly brought about the mega terrorism. The greatest blunder of the (US or other influential powers’) response to mega terrorism is taking on the warring model of military aggression, which provides the terrorists with the legitimacy that they have not had before. Corruption affairs in Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and some other Balkan countries additionally corroborate that the transition processes in most South East and even East European countries are accompanied by side effects in the forms of the economic and political systems criminalization resulting in serious issues of power distribution in the Balkan transitions. In newly formed democracy, which is in conformity with contemporary trends in the development of the so called "polyarchic" democracy, political decisions are not always and necessarily made by institutions as state representatives, though they are made within these institutions. Public policy is separated from the public and there emerges chronic deficit of government legitimacy. Parts of political establishment, linked to organized crime, create a climate of "the goal justifying the means" or of "anything being allowed what is not strictly forbidden" which helps creating the conditions for legitimizing the corruption and organized crime. The manifested destructive role of organized groups, and the attitude of current authorities even of a part of the public, towards these groups during interethnic conflicts, and later on, have made it quite clear that the links between organized crime and political elites in all parts of the former SFR Yugoslavia are maintained through mutual client relationship, which the international actors have nourished by their inconsistent behavior. The inconsistency of international support contributes to creating client cultures and these cultures lead to building relatively enduring partnerships between political elites and organized crime. Thus a new type of organized crime emerges retaining classic feature (crime for profit), but is also modified into "a new warring entity" that resorts also to the fight against the state aiming to take over the state power. The main problem in legitimizing the violence in international relations in that this entails also legitimizing the terrorist response to the monopolizing of the international relations and to the so called intervention wars. The current US trend of re-legitimizing the violence as a method of combating the terror is historically and safety wise retrograde. In such a way the worldwide terror stigma is just reduced while enlarging room for arguments of "the terrorist having no choice". The same or the similar is true for organized crime in Serbia or any other country under transition in South East Europe. The author believes that the main principle of successful combating terrorism is maintaining the moral status of nonviolence as an imperative in the international relations. Contemporary politics, primarily the U.S. global policy, which is based exactly on re-legitimizing the violence, is in advance doomed to failure in combating the terror.
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