The author of the leading interpretation of the guarantee of human dignity in German constitution of the second half of the twentieth century was German lawyer Gunter Durig. At the core of his analysis of the concept of dignity, placed on the top of the Bonn constitution, was the equalization of dignity with the essence of human rights alongside with his statement that dignity understood as their 'untouchable' (unantastbar) substance should be ultimately and infinitely protected. The new millennium brought a more radical turn from this influential legal understanding of human dignity. Although not isolated in his venture of critique of Durigs analysis, Matthias Herdegens new interpretation of the first article was even more distinct for its clear abandon of the basic ideas of his predecessor as well as for the fact that it actually replaced the Durigs paradigmatic commentary. The author of this article analyses Herdegens interpretation of the concept of human dignity and compares it to the preceding but also rival Durigs understanding. The comparison of Durigs and Herdegens standpoint is further illuminated and put in a wider context by taking into consideration two cases largely debated in Germany whose interpretation showed to be dependant on the understanding of the ideas of 'untouchableness' and human dignity (Luftsichercheitsgesetz-case and Rettungsfolter-case). As result of examination of the complex nature of these cases and the legalphilosophical and ethical presuppositions and consequences of the two rival theories of 'untouchableness' and human dignity, it is concluded that notwithstanding their different success in responding to the particular problems, this alternative necessarily leaves law condemned to some degree of tragedy and absurdity.