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2020, vol. 67, br. 1, str. 69-92
Pecuniary incentive in tournaments and effects of players' heterogeneity on efforts in the Association of Tennis Professionals
(naslov ne postoji na srpskom)
Shih Hsin University, Department of Economics, Taiwan

Ključne reči: competition; heterogeneous contestants; random-effects logistic model; superstar effects; tournament theory
(ne postoji na srpskom)
This article addresses the issues of players' heterogeneity in individual efforts and winning probability in the Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP) games. ATP players' personal characteristics and performance from 2011 to 2013 are collected. The results show that a negative impact of the matchup's heterogeneity on the intensity of the game is found. The evidence thus indicates that the two players play harder when the heterogeneity is smaller. Evidence also indicate that the pecuniary incentive in tournaments is supported, and appearance of a superstar makes his opponent exert less effort. In the odds ratio analysis for the players' heterogeneity, a rank differential increases a favorite player with 1.004% winning percentage in ATP matches. Younger, lower BMI, experienced, and right-hand players are more likely to win.
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O članku

jezik rada: engleski
vrsta rada: izvorni naučni članak
DOI: 10.2298/PAN170206017J
objavljen u SCIndeksu: 09.06.2020.
Creative Commons License 4.0

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