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2021, vol. 12, br. 2, str. 153-169
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Menadžerske kompenzacije i modeli za rešavanje agencijskog problema
Managerial compensations and models for solving agency problems
aUniverzitet u Beogradu, Ekonomski fakultet bUniverzitet u Beogradu, Fakultet organizacionih nauka
e-adresa: dogandzic.petar@gmail.com
Sažetak
Menadžeri kao nosioci funkcije upravljanja donose odluke kojima upravljaju akcionarskim društvom, koje bi trebalo da postignu rezultate i ciljeve koji su u interesu pre svega njegovih vlasnika odnosno akcionara. Tokom rada društva, menadžeri često donose odluke koje su prvenstveno usklađene sa njihovim ličnim interesima, dok se u drugi plan stavljaju interesi akcionara. Radi rešavanja ili ublažavanja ovog problema potrebno je identifikovati primenjive i delotvorne modele. U radu se posebno ističe značaj menadžerskih kompenzacija baziranih na rezultatima poslovanja kompanije. Sistem nagrađivanja predstavlja strategijski instrument pomoću kojeg se uspostavlja povezanost interesa menadžera i interesa akcionara. Za povezivanje njihovih interesa neophodno je kompenzacione pakete zasnivati na kombinaciji različitih merila performansi. U cilju obezbeđenja kvalitetnog korporativnog upravljanja neophodno je formirati adekvatne organe kontrole njihovog rada, kao i skup pravila ili kodeksa koji se odnosi na korporativno upravljanje. Kombinacijom navedenih aktivnosti formira se i zadržava dobar odnos između vlasnika i menadžera uz realizaciju usklađenih interesa.
Abstract
Managers, as holders of the management function, make decisions by which they manage a joint stock company, which should achieve results and goals that are in the interest of its owners or shareholders in the first place. During the work of the company, managers often make decisions that are primarily in line with their personal interests, while the interests of shareholders are put in the background. In order to solve or mitigate this problem, it is necessary to identify applicable and effective models. The paper especially emphasizes the importance of managerial compensations, based on the company's business results. The reward system is a strategic instrument that establishes the connection between the interests of managers and the interests of shareholders. To connect their interests, it is necessary to base compensation packages on a combination of different performance measures. In order to ensure quality corporate governance, it is necessary to form adequate control bodies for their work, as well as a set of rules or codes related to corporate governance. The combination of the above activities forms and maintains a good relationship between the owner and the manager with the realization of harmonized interests.
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