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2022, vol. 56, iss. 1, pp. 3-23
After American exceptionalism: 21st century 'Thucydides trap'
Institute for Political Studies, Belgrade
Keywords: liberal hegemony; politics of sovereignty; equality; "Thucydides Trap"; multipolarity; multilateralism
In the centre of this interdisciplinary investigation is the issue of primary political, philosophical and social foundations of the project of liberal hegemony - as well as real-political end of this discourse in the 21stcentury. The politics of interventionism and human rights is opposed to the politics of sovereignty in such a way that the structural difference between the 20th century Western elitism and the perspective of the multipolar world is the differentiation between hierarchical systems of power and politics of equality. The constitutive part of these processes is "the rebirth of history" through which a more just order is to be established and political consequences for the world will significantly depend on whether crypto-idealistic i.e., "Wilsonian school" will prevail in the USA. Therefore, the issue whether it is possible to avoid "Thucydides Trap" in the 21st century refers to the difference between "necessary America" and "independent America". Multipolarity as the basis of true multilateralism appears as a potentially new model for the implementation of the politics of sovereign equality.

The fall of liberal hegemony

“Indeed, that order was destined to fail from the start
as it contained the seeds of its own destruction.”
              John J. Mearsheimer

At the political – philosophical level – as well as the world politics and general social levels – the first decades of the 21st century have already been recognized as the era of systematic change that almost marks the beginning of a new epoch, i.e. the end of one order and the emergence of another (Ikenberry, 2018). More precisely, neoliberalism in theory and practice – and particularly the manners in which it was realized through the politics of interventionism and human rights – has been opposed by the politics of sovereignty that is focused on the concept of self-establishment. In that light, the main difference between the two processes is in the fact that globalism via unipolarity permanently produced different structures of hierarchal relations – ergo was realized as a system of power and domination – while, on the other hand, politics of sovereignty as the sine qua non of the new century promotes equality which eo ipso also means the end of tutorship. As a matter of fact, that is how the fall of neoliberalism as a totalizing ideology also came to mark the end of "the end of history", i.e. its rebirth (Kagan, 2009, Badiou, 2012, Welsh, 2016), whose practical manifestation, in the broadest terms, is the end of neo-colonial domination throughout the world. At the same time, these are also the main reasons why transition of the world from "one" to "many" largely exceeds the quantitative level, i.e. why it is primarily a political-ethnic attempt to establish a more fair order. In the specific context, it may even be said that it is an attempt of returning to Aristotelian measure as the middle way between the extremes, which guides zoon politikon as zoon logonechon.

However, we should first bear in mind that – as Mearsheimer rightfully emphasizes – after the Cold War, the USA "was so powerful that it could adopt a foreign policy that is usually called liberal hegemony", and that "liberal hegemony is an ambitious strategy aimed at turning as many countries as possible into liberal democracies" (Mearsheimer, 2018, p. 7). Moreover, a number of techniques were used for that purpose – from various forms of regime change and social engineering, to the use of force, while the basic theoretical postulate was the binary opposition between human rights and authoritarianism, i.e. this opposition replaced the former Aronian one between democracy and totalitarianism. The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 was the moment when liberal hegemony began and Fukuyama's The End of History symbolically proclaimed "alternativelessness" of liberalism.

In the following period, different discourses of neoliberal hegemony – ranging from deconstruction and postmodernism to divergent analytical and pragmatic approaches – actually, seemingly paradoxically, laid the foundations of the twentieth-century elitism of the West and philosophy of power. Together with it, even more conspicuously, liberal discourses in various forms emerged as endless constant production of the Hobbesian image of the world that, at the same time, always referred to absolutization and crypto-Manichean approach based on the set of binary relations, with crypto-Schmidt opposition "friend – enemy" in its centre. Concurrently, the ethical "justification" for endless wars and "humanitarian interventions" – aimed at totalization – was developed through Kantian discourse about "eternal peace", which should appear as a projected substitute of the best possible world and, as such, also as the desired "end of history" at the same time. In addition, this "eternal peace" needed to be achieved through the prior enemy dehumanization, i.e. political and social promotion of absolute evil, out of which numerous liberal just war theories could consequently be articulated (Elshtain, Johnson, Walzer).

It was liberalism in foreign affairs, articulated through the so-called democratic peace theory that emphasized the mentioned paradox of liberal democracies not waging mutual wars, but not being more peaceful in any way. Namely, the prevalence of militarism within neoliberal theories and practices is directly related to the fact that, in the contemporary context, progressive liberalism has tipped the scales over modus vivendi liberalism, i.e. the affirmation of the so-called positive rights eo ipso meant the promotion of human rights and social engineering – as well as the triumph of the interventionist state (Mearsheimer, 2018, p. 9). In that light, ambitious liberal foreign politics in various aspects has made the world less peaceful or, more precisely, through the series of endless wars, liberal hegemony has practically almost completely into liberal militarism. Moreover, such liberal strategy at the same time undermined the concept of sovereignty as the basic norm of international politics, while the presence of the powerful militant power wanting to wage wars increased the number of conflicts in the international system.

However, the 21st century – despite Fukuyama's insistence that the withdrawal from Afghanistan was not the end of the American era – exactly through the example of the American departure from the airport in Kabul emerged as a living expression of the end of the American era. Ergo, at the foreign policy level, the processes of epoch transition (Koljević Griffith, 2021) primarily correspond to the end of Pax Americana (Layne, 2012), i.e. with the fall of the US liberal hegemony which., in terms of Realpolitik, is replaced by the powers like Russia and China, whose rise is only one of the structural reasons for the departure of neoliberalism from the historical stage. The second reason refers to twofold (self)destruction within the Western order through increasing political, social and cultural polarization and thus through internal weakening of the USA on the one hand, and through increasingly conspicuous different forms of the ever more present "transatlantic divorce" between the USA and the EU, on the other hand. As for the former, it is absolutely unequivocal that the foreign-policy end of the US unipolarity was at the same time causa efficiens of its internal political and social dissolution just as, on the other hand, the historical time of the fall of neoliberalism inevitable had also to appear as the political-normative stratification between America and Europe. There is no dilemma that the above-mentioned changes point to extremely complex processes implying the opposition at divergent levels, and that is why there is a more and more transparent question as to whether the transition of epochs will transpire to be a peaceful transfer or large-or small-scale conflicts are in store for the world.

In relevant terms, this outcome will depend, conditionally speaking, on the outcome of the struggle between "neoliberals" and "sovereignists" in the USA, i.e. primarily on the question whether Realpolitik will prevail in America after all. As Kissinger rightfully observed, the USA should yet decide what role to play in the 21st century, and the choice was exactly between the policy of "American Exceptionalism" and the policy of "America First". Bremmer defined this difference as the difference between "indispensable America" and "independent America" (Bremmer, 2015), because in the former case there is always an attitude of the assumed superiority practically at all levels, while the latter concept points to the position of the recognition of world equality and sovereignty.

Therefore, in the neoliberal discourse this differentiation is articulated as a difference between "isolationism" and "internationalism", in order to divert attention to the constructed ethical and political superiority of interventionism and further emphasize that it is the only conceivable internationalism both in theory and in practice (Johnstone, 2011). In that light, Haass points to the fact that this approach is completely paradigmatic for the followers of the so-called crypto-idealistic or "Wilsonian" school", striving to change the entire societies through the "improvement of human rights and democracy" (Haass, 2018, p. 222). Progressive liberals such as Dworkin, Fukuyama and Rawls – but, to a large extent, Kant before them – here practically correspond to the Wilsonian school of "spreading democracy" with the aim of making the world "safe for democracy" (Mearsheimer, 2018, p. 121). Ergo, yet another repetition of the already seen choice of "American Exceptionalism" would imply further struggle of the USA for imperial dominance and, vice versa, the acceptance of "American equality" would point to the awareness of increasing multipolarity (Flockhart, 2016).

According to Mearsheimer's discourse, however, failures of the US foreign policy since 1989 need to be considered through trichotomy of liberalism, nationalism and realism, i.e. the prevalence of the first-mentioned meant not understanding that nationalism and realism are always more influential in the world sphere. Equally, Mearsheimer stresses that militarism always practically ends up as an opposite to its own declarative liberal values, and that "the structure of the international system is anarchic and not hierarchical, which means that liberalism applied to international politics cannot succeed" (Mearsheimer, 2018, p. 3). More precisely, in his book The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities he says that liberal hegemony has always been substantially elitist, so its elitism, among other things – and in seemingly contradiction – appears through the constant use of the word "community" – ranging from "international community", via "transatlantic community" to "European community".

The following aspect refers to the fact that the EU has for some time now been undergoing multiple opposition between transatlantic elites on the one side and the people on the other side (Koljević & Fusaro, 2016) – this discrepancy most often appears as a struggle between the so-called "Brussels class" i.e. Eurocracy, and individual European countries, while simultaneously as the struggle between neoliberalism and the politics of sovereignty. Biopolitical governance in the 21st century – which in the EU, as well as in the USA, has assumed a completely new character of population control during the virus pandemic – has the consequence in the fact that European turmoil increasingly points to the matters of freedom, justice and equality. Of course, the outlined processes almost completely correspond to the gradual liberation of Europe from the practically absolute decades-long dominance of the USA in the political, normative, social and economic spheres and, consequently, they are also manifested in the questioning of the main neoliberal institutions such as the EU and NATO. In that light, liberals such as Timothy Garton Ash even observe that processes in modern Europe increasingly look like 1989 in reverse" (Ash, 2015).

That is why it is relevant to bear in mind that the EU is unlikely to recover the former degree of neoliberal homogeneity in the 21st century, i.e. that the project of the European community will either be substantially transformed or ended – but in both cases the direction will be towards the return of the sovereignty of the states. At the same time, en generale, to the extent of the strengthening of the old continent autonomy, Europe will increasingly emerge "from Lisbon to Vladivostok" just as, in parallel, there is an increasingly recognizable strategic role of China in South and East Europe. Specifically, although primarily Greater Asia – from Shanghai to Saint Petersburg – is the most prominent on the map of Eurasia, Great Asia by no means annuls the concept of Great Europe, but actually emerges as the first and one of the most important guidelines for the changes in the European countries and the shift towards post-interventionist Europe. In addition, the Russian-Chinese alliance in almost all spheres appears as a power that deconstructs (and destroys) American hegemony in Asia and Europe (Chaise, 2018) and at the same time as a par excellence expression of the return of sovereignty into international relations (Alles & Badie, 2016) as opposed to totalizing neoliberalism.

Reality of "Thucydides Trap"

“What made war inevitable was the growth of
Athenian power and the fear which this caused in

At the outset, it should be taken into account that Allison was the first to articulate the matter of the modern "Thucydides Trap", stressing that, according to the historical experience, "the war between the USA and China is more likely that it seems at the moment". He accurately analyzed the relations between the rising power and the still-ruling power that is weakening. According to Allison's research, this relation – metaphorically and structurally resembling the relation between Athens and Sparta that led to the Peloponnesian War – has resulted in war in 12 out of 16 historical cases in the past five hundred years, but it is still not inevitable, although it entails plenty of effort to be avoided (Allison, 2015).

It is unequivocal how Thucydides – as a par excellence forefather of realism – brought to light the very core of the problem, i.e. structural turbulences causing rapid changes in the balance of power between the two rivals, further emphasizing that in such foreign policy dynamics there are two basic moments, i.e. the feeling of importance of the rising power and fear and determination of the other side to defend status quo. In his book Destined for War, Allison explains that, despite such dynamics of two powers and the fact that structural conflicts may lead to a major conflict – the USA and China may avoid this outcome, and that China's aim is to become the "regional hegemon", but noting that those are "incompatible cultures and political systems" (Allison, 2017).

When criticizing Allison, Clark, on his part, actually criticizes Thucydides as well – while constantly citing Kagan who pointed out that Athens and Sparta could have co-existed in their particularities if only there had been "better governance". Clark goes on to conclude that it is inadequate to compare the USA with Sparta that used to be the "total hegemon" as opposed to China as Athens (Clark, 2020). Nevertheless, having in mind how Pericles emphasizes that Athens, unlike its totalitarian enemies, cherished the exchange of goods, people and ideas with other parts of the world, and that American totalitarian character is in the centre of its liberal hegemony, it seems that the parallel relevantly corresponds to the modern context. Implicitly, Clark himself faced contradiction because finally he concludes that "it is impossible to compare Athens and NATO because Athens resembled more the Soviet Union in numerous aspects […] and NATO is the partnership of democratic countries" (Clark, 2020, p. 43).

Haass insists that no contemporary relation is more relevant than the relation between the USA and China, which constitutes the greatest challenge to American primacy, and that, in all probability, no relation will encounter "greater difficulties". Repeating Thucydides, Haass emphasizes that "great part of history is reduced to disagreements leading to conflicts between the existing powers and the emerging powers […], which is reflected in the fact that the balance of power cannot be easily re-established in a peaceful manner" (Haass, 2018, p. 75). Haass stresses that exactly the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union marked the disappearance of the connective tissue of American-Chinese rapprochement, and that these two countries are still searching for something that would take the place of anti-Sovietism which had been the basis of their relations until 1989 (Haass, 2018, p. 87). He concludes that the realistic school of international relations would, per definitionem, actually predict the inevitable worsening of American-Chinese relations. It is relevant to bear in mind that Haass points to the Cold War as an actual, to a substantial extent, being the "factor of order" because, apart from the balance of power, there was also the joint concept of the essence of legitimacy, as well as the diplomatic process necessary for keeping the balance.

In a sense, in the contemporary situation it is still possible to apply the thesis of Paul Kennedy who – stating the reasons why great powers experienced rises and falls throughout their history – points out that the burden of preserving the empire often undermined progress and thus the stability in a country. Moreover, in that light a question arises whether – in an extremely radical interpretation – the USA will begin a world war in order to avoid a potential large-scale civil conflict in its own territory, and the outcome of both processes will actually largely depend on yet another conflict of Wilsonian crypto-idealism and foreign-policy realism. In that respect, Haass articulates that what makes a country weak is primarily "the inability to control what happens within its own borders" (Haass, 2018: 106). Furthermore, there are relevant arguments that the likelihood of larger-scale conflicts will reciprocally increase to an extent in which Asian economies catch up with the West, or that the increasing conflict potential will follow to an extent in which China overcomes the USA in different spheres (Arase, 2017).

The next moment, however, refers to the fact that the existence of the united West is on the decrease, and that even the apologists of the Western system such as Bremmer, for example, believe that the USA "is less and less able to establish coalitions, to enact trade agreements, to ensure support for sanctions, to mediate in reaching a compromise in international disputes or to persuade others into joining them in a conflict" (Bremmer, 2015, p. 19). Still, Bremmer is not precise in his assessment that the relations between the West and Russia "can by no means be a new Cold War because Russia lacks international allies, ideological appeal and military power of the Soviet Union" (Bremmer, 2015, p. 12). Haass is actually closer to foreign policy reality when concluding that the "the USA is still the most powerful entity in the world, but its share in global power is decreasing, just as its ability to turn its huge power into influence […] The result is the world in which centrifugal forces have a stronger effect" (Haass, 2018, p. 11). Namely, Russian readiness and ability to act in the Middle East – just as Chinese in the South China Sea – have put an end to the expansive post-Cold War attitude about the power of America. Haass's interpretation, however, ends with an approach that Bremmer would mark as a combination of the "moneyball approach" and "indispensable America", i.e. by saying that Thucydides Trap should be opposed because any worsening in the relations of great powers would be rather expensive and, as such, would divert the attention from world and regional challenges that need to be resolved. Naturally, Haass's opinion that the best solution for the USA is to include Russia and China "in the world order", i.e. that it is necessary to apply the "integration policy", still presupposes the primacy of the American order from the past century, and that is why it is not applicable in the contemporary context.

On the other hand, Wright, for example, emphasizes that "American alliances and security arrangements" were an "exceptional success" and that America's global withdrawal would be a mistake because such strategy would "destabilize regional security orders in Europe and Asia and increase the threat of a large-scale conflict" (Wright, 2020, p. 11). In parallel, Wertheim, quite oppositely, claims that it was the American "grand strategy" that turned the USA into a "destructive power in the world" that endangered the "interests of the majority" and that, by waging wars, Washington destroyed "the laws and institutions stabilizing the world" (Wertheim, 2020:19). Therefore, Wertheim insists that the USA should give up its global role and that America should no longer be the world policeman that undertakes endless military interventions, but that "a grand strategy for the majority" should be made..

To that end, as one of the potentially theoretically and practically most fruitful proposals is made by Allison, who points out that the USA should face the loss of hegemony through the acceptance of the "sphere of influence" concept (Allison, 2020) – how effective this idea is in foreign policy terms is shown by the fact that liberal interventionists are radically against it. Wright even points out that it is equal to the idea of "the USA withdrawal" and that this idea, apart from "realists", is increasingly joined by "progressive liberals" such as l Wertheim and Beinart. At the same time, Allison reminds that, after the Cold War, the USA declared the end of the "spheres of influence", calling the end of that world, but what actually happened is that the whole world became the American sphere, i.e. that the "spheres of influence did not disappear, but became one sphere through the fact of American hegemony" (Allison, 2020, p. 30). In the situation when the time of the US unipolarity has gone by, according to Allison, the reality should be accepted of the spheres of influence existing in the world – and not all of these spheres being American. Attention is also paid to the fact that, although the concept of the "sphere of influence" appeared in diplomacy at the beginning of the 19th century, it has actually existed as long as international relations themselves. Therefore, Thucydides, for example, observed that after the defeat of Persians, Sparta demanded that Athens should not build new walls around its city-state in order to remain vulnerable.

On their part, Lind and Press point out that the US goals should be limited in line with national and international realities, particularly putting the emphasis on the fact that American power has weakened internally, and that large parts of the public have lost trust in the liberal project that used to govern the Western foreign politics for a long period of time (Lind & Press, 2020). At the same time, Krasner claims that America should be satisfied with "sufficiently good governance", i.e. cooperate with statesmen in the world so that this approach would have effects both at the security and economic levels (Krasner, 2020). Ergo, to answer the question about reality of "Thucydides Trap" in the 21st century, it is necessary to consider the question as to the extent in which the above-mentioned political-theoretical recommendations correspond to political realities and balance of great powers. In that respect, it is indisputable that American President Biden – in the text entitled "Why America Needs To Lead Again" – keeps the position of the "triumph of democracy and liberalism" as the position defining the future, and points out that Western alliance "transcends dollars and cents, and that the US obligation is sacred [...] NATO is the embodiment of the liberal-democratic ideal – the alliance of values" (Biden, 2020, p. 73). Furthermore, Biden consistently once again exemplifies transatlantic elitism, i.e. the position of the USA superiority and the hierarchical world order. For example, he explains that America must be the leader because no other nation has such capacity, because no other nation has grown on the idea of freedom (Biden, 2020, p. 76).

In contrast to this, however, Chinese President Xi Jinping emphasized that no mistake must be made in the strategic calculation because in that manner Thucydides Trap could really occur –thus denying Allison's claim that China is building its own discourse of "exceptionalism". That liberal foreign politics constantly produces instability and conflict is also demonstrated by Mearsheimer's insight that "American politics towards Ukraine, motivated by liberal logic, is principally responsible for the current crisis between Russia and the West" (Mearsheimer, 2018: 5). Equally – having in mind the relations between the USA and China – a number of authors from Bremmer to Ferguson are not convincing in their argumentation that the USA and Europe will "as one" oppose Beijing, i.e. Mearsheimer seems to be much closer to the truth about Realpolitik perspective of the European development in the 21st century. In fact, far before Brzezinski it was known that the one controlling Eurasia also ruled the world and, in that aspect – completely opposite to Brzezinski's aspirations – Russia and China realized the American geopolitical dream, so that is why the 21st century turns out to be their Eurasian century. Therefore, having in mind that – as Nye observes – the key trigger for the reality of "Thucydides Trap" is the excessive reaction to fear of losing own status of power, it follows that the most effective way of overcoming it is contained in Kissinger's definition of diplomacy as "the art of restraining force" (Kissinger, 1999, p. 2).

Multipolarity as the basis of true multilateralism

“No one believes anymore in America’s power to
straddle the small world like a colossus…”
               Ian Bremmer

In relevant terms, the 21st century is a testimony of how politics is shaped by exactly what Bourdieu denoted as "habitus", i.e. how cultures of specific societies transpire to be an inevitable factor for understanding foreign policy realities, as well as the potential for their shaping in the new era (Bourdieu, 2002). More precisely, the entire liberal discourse about the "global society" turns out to be contradictio in adjecto because the levelling of cultural differences did not lead to any universal culture that was the prerequisite of the global society. Ergo, totalizing aspirations of neoliberalism via globalism aimed at the affirmation of sameness as opposed to otherness and differences and one as opposed to multitude came to an end with the processes of the "rebirth of history" and the establishment of the subjectivity of the nation. In these processes, as Mearsheimer observes, a fact has been brought to light that heterogeneity and not homogeneity is the state of culture, but also that cultural and historical identities reflect normative frameworks of both specific discourses and communities, and that, e.g. "a liberal state makes rather little emotional connection among citizens and their authorities, due to which it is sometimes said that it is particularly difficult to persuade people to fight and die for a liberal state" (Mearsheimer, 2018, p. 51).

Considering civilizational, cultural and historical specifics of different rising powers – and also starting from the fact that at the level of foreign politics it would be most appropriate to realize the system that would be completely different from liberal interventionism – a new discourse of multipolarity is gradually established. In a nutshell, the starting position is that basic principles of international relations – such as mutual respect, equality and willingness to resolve world issues through dialogue – should become the focus of the emerging order.

In that respect, if it is possible to speak of the reverse globalization via globalization from the East, then this is exactly the most vivid expression of the fact that true globalization is the matter of multipolarity and not of one power's hegemony. In addition, this is the point of encounter of realism, multipolarity and multilateralism because it is the foreign politics of realism that perceives 21st-century multipolarity, while the new discourse of multipolarity is based on creating a general framework in which diversities would be respect, the framework that would be common for all. In parallel, one of the basic principles of the multipolar via multilateral discourse refers to the creation of the collective security system that would be equal for all countries (Cox, 2016), which would not only overcome the arms race but, structurally even more relevant, the dichotomy "friend–enemy" Furthermore, it becomes theoretically and practically transparent that through the reality of the multipolar world in combination with the adoption of the equality principle at the political-normative level perspectives are opened for true multilateralism.

In parallel, this new concept recognizes the anarchic nature of international relations or, more specifically, the fact that they neither can nor should be hierarchically structured and bases its idea of the new world community on the respect of diversities – from which the principle derives of non-interference in internal policies of individual states and the respect for sovereignty. That is how the world policy of equality turns out to be a par excellence expression of democracy, i.e. its realization at different levels. In this respect as well, the principle of sovereignty does not exclude internationalism at all, but, on the contrary, in the multipolar world establishing new multilateralism they are internally intertwined.

Furthermore, according to the UN Charter, all countries enjoy "sovereign equality" (Article 2, Paragraph 1) just as nothing in the Charter authorizes the UN to intervene in the matters that are by their essence within the internal jurisdiction of each country. Among other things, Helsinki Final Act from 1975 is an example of multilateral agreement based on the assumptions such as sovereignty, inadmissibility of a threat of force or of use of force, commitment to peaceful dispute resolution and acceptance of the principle of non-interference in the internal matters of other countries. Briefly, the new concept for the 21st century should start from the basics of the Westphalian order destroyed by the liberal order because, inter alia, NATO as one of the crucial institutions of neoliberal hegemony has undertaken "missions outside the territory […] thus becoming something like an interventionist power for problem resolution" (Haass, 2018, p. 90), and that is no longer a model to be followed.

Haass articulates that, in the post-Cold War world, international law had the smallest influence in the event of the highest political stakes, and that it is necessary to introduce a new definition of legitimacy – while admitting that "legitimacy is impossible to define only in terms of the process if there is no consensus about norms and rules" (Haass, 2018, p. 191). Understandably, the above-mentioned elements become relevant to discourses and practices if the USA adopts the new Declaration of Independence, i.e. the proclamation that would release Americans from the self-imposed crypto-responsibility for solving world problems (Bremmer, 2015, p. 63). Namely, it would mean overcoming the concept of "independent America" or, at least, "moneyball America" whose cost-benefit approach equally gives up the position of "American Exceptionalism" and points to the common sense approach that also adopts the realistic position of the necessity of keeping the balance of power in order to avoid any conflict (Snyder, Van Evera, Waltz).

In that manner, historical-cultural and political specific characteristics of individual nations and their states, i.e. multiplicity of different existential patterns can fully correspond to the new principles of the multipolar world, the adoption of which would not only avoid "Thucydides Trap", but also simultaneously establish the multilateralism of a different order.


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article language: Serbian, English
document type: Original Scientific Paper
DOI: 10.5937/socpreg56-36680
published in SCIndeks: 29/04/2022
peer review method: double-blind
Creative Commons License 4.0

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