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2009, vol. 57, br. 4, str. 216-235
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Ljudsko dostojanstvo - ustavno pravo, apsolutni ideal ili osporavana vrednost?
Human dignity: Constitutional right, absolute ideal, or contested value?
Pravni fakultet, Stelenboš, Južna Afrika
Sažetak
Ovaj rad istražuje ideju ljudskog dostojanstva kao primarne ustavne vrednosti, sa naglaskom naročito na slučaj Južne Afrike nakon aparthejda. Autor pokazuje da Ustavni sud u ovoj državi navodi dostojanstvo kao utuživo pravo i postavlja dostojanstvo u središte svoje jurisprudencije. Sud je međutim, kritikovan ne zbog toga što postavlja dostojanstvo iznad drugih vrednosti, kao što su demokratija i jednakost, već zbog stava da je dostojanstvo toliko otvoren pojam da se može navoditi za opravdanje gotovo svih ishoda. U tom smislu, autor proučava pet vrsta paradoksa koji se nalaze u samoj srži ljudskog dostojanstva. Prvo, ljudska prava zahtevaju apsolutnu posvećenost sferi neprikosnovenosti ličnosti, ali ljudsko dostojanstvo je preovlađujuća vrednost koja se nalazi u osnovi mnogih prava i ne može da izbegne da bude podvrgnuto usklađivanju. Drugo, ljudsko dostojanstvo je svojstveno svim ljudima i prevazilazi kulturne razlike i nacionalne granice a njegova zaštita i tačno značenje zavise od njegove konkretizacije u određenom pravnom poretku. Treće, dostojanstvo je svojstveno svakom ljudskom biću, ali ono zavisi od materijalnih uslova i društvenog položaja svake pojedinačne osobe. Četvrto, dostojanstvo zahteva poštovanje kulturnih i simboličnih procesa putem kojih svaki pojedinac postaje osoba i osmišljava svoj svet. S druge strane, poštovanje nečijeg dostojanstva podrazumeva priznanje da je ta osoba sposobna da prevaziđe strukture pojedinačnog društveno-ekonomskog porekla i da izgradi autonomni identitet. Konačno dostojanstvo je povezano sa ličnom autonomijom i pretpostavlja pravo da se slobodno izaberu sopstvena sredstva, a poštovanje dostojanstva podrazumeva postavljanje određenih ograničenja slobodi, naročito kada je reč o preovlađujućoj privatnoj vlasti, preteranom konzumerizmu i neravnopravnosti. Autor zaključuje da bez obzira na svoju paradoksalnu prirodu, ljudsko dostojanstvo može da ograniči obim legitimnih ustavnih tumačenja. U tom smislu, južnoafričko iskustvo pruža interesantan primer proučavanja načina na koje globalne pravne norme postaju pouzdane, prilagođavaju se i konkretizuju unutar nacionalnih pravnih poredaka.
Abstract
This paper explores the idea of human dignity as a prime constitutional value, discussing in particular the case of post-Apartheid South Africa. The author shows that the Constitutional Court in this country, has invoked dignity as a justifiable right, and it has placed dignity at the center of its constitutional jurisprudence. However, the Court was criticized not for placing dignity above other values, such as democracy and equality, but for claiming that dignity is so open-ended that it could be invoked to justify almost any outcome. In that respect, the author explores five paradoxes which lie at the heart of human dignity. First, human rights demand the absolute commitment to the sphere of personal inviolability, but human dignity is a pervasive value which underlies a variety of rights and cannot escape being subject to balancing. Second, human dignity is inherent to all human beings and transcends cultural differences and national boundaries, but its protection and exact meaning depends on its concretization in a particular legal order. Third, human dignity is inherent to every human being, but it depends on material conditions and social standing of every person. Fourth dignity demands respect for the cultural and symbolic processes through which every individual becomes person and makes sense of his/her world. On the other hand, the respect for someone's dignity requires recognition of that person's capacity to transcend the structures of individual socio-economic background and to forge an autonomous identity. Finally, dignity is related to personal autonomy and presupposes the right to freely choose his/her own ends, but respect for dignity requires placing certain limits on freedom particularly in relation to pervasive private power, excessive consumerism and inequality. The author concludes that despite its paradoxical nature human dignity can constrain the range of legitimate constitutional interpretations. In that respect, the South African experience provides an interesting case study of the ways in which global legal norms are relied upon, adapted and concretized within a national legal order.
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