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2017, vol. 65, br. 1-2, str. 113-127
Kako podići stepen naplate poreza i poreski moral u Srbiji?
Univerzitet u Beogradu, Ekonomski fakultet, Katedra za ekonomsku politiku i razvoj
Ključne reči: siva ekonomija; utaja poreza; primena poreskih propisa; poreska politika; ekonomska politika
Sažetak
Siva ekonomija u Srbiji se procenjuje na oko 31% BDP-a, tj. za oko jednu šestinu iznad proseka zemalja Centralne i Istočne Evrope (CIE), ukazujući na visok nivo utaje poreza i nizak nivo poreskog morala, što ima ozbiljne posledice po održivost javnih finansija, kvalitet dobara koja pruža javni sektor i uslove poslovanja. U ovom radu se analiziraju uzroci visokog nivoa sive ekonomije i utaje poreza u Srbiji u poređenju sa drugim državama CIE i identifikuju se ključni elementi efektivne strategije za suzbijanje utaje poreza i povećanje poreskog morala. Siva ekonomija i utaja poreza zavise od fundamentalnih faktora (visina poreza, kazni i verovatnoće otkrivanja), kao i od drugih faktora koji utiču na spremnost obveznika da dobrovoljno plaćaju porez (poreski moral). Rezultati ukazuju da visina poreza i struktura poreskog opterećenja u Srbiji, kao i kaznena politika, ne odstupaju značajno od proseka CIE, dok je verovatnoća otkrivanja utaje poreza verovatno niža. U pogledu determinanti poreskog morala, Srbija ostvaruje rezultate uporedive sa prosekom zemalja CIE u domenu troškova primene poreskih propisa, dok česte poreske amnestije i nizak kvalitet dobara i usluga koje pruža javni sektor (u poređenju sa drugim državama CIE) ima negativan uticaj na poreski moral i utaju poreza. Efektivna strategija za suzbijanje utaje poreza i podizanje poreskog morala bi trebalo da bude zasnovana na temeljnoj reformi Poreske uprave, kredibilnom obavezivanju države da će se prekinuti sa praksom poreskih amnestija, kao i na skupu mera za unapređenje osnovnih dobara i usluga koje pruža javni sektor.
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O članku

jezik rada: engleski
vrsta rada: pregledni članak
DOI: 10.5937/ekopre1702113R
objavljen u SCIndeksu: 21.05.2017.