One of the fundamental notions of law of contract at common law is certainly the institution of consideration. In order to have a legally binding and enforceable promise, it must be supported by consideration. If the promise lacks consideration, it will be held unenforceable, unless another ground of enforceability is present (formality, for instance). The notion of consideration emerged and began its evolution in the late XVI and early XVII century, when the action of assumpsit tended to replace the old action of debt. Since the moment when verdict had been delivered in the famous Slade’s Case at the very beginning of XVII century, the action of assumpsit became the most usual form of action by which all contractual claims could have been enforced, regardless of the nature of breach of promise (action of assumpsit could have been brought both in case of misfeasance and nonfeasance). The most important criterion whether an action of assumpsit would fail or succeed was whether the promise upon which an action had been filed was supported by consideration or not. Consideration, at the time when it emerged, meant either a detriment for promise or a benefit to the promisor. However, in the late XIX century the detriment/benefit test of consideration came under scrutiny and consideration got a new dimension. Namely, the issue whether the promisor gained a benefit or the promise suffered a detriment is not crucial anymore. A promise is supported by consideration if there is an exchange between the parties, which exchange is a result of fair and undisturbed bargaining process. This is called the bargained-for exchange notion of consideration. The present paper tends to define what the term bargained-for exchange means and when is a promise supported/or not supported by consideration under the bargained-for exchange test.