The institution of Constitutional Court is one of the most powerful levers of constitutionalization of the state power. This institution exists in Serbia for more than 45 years. Nevertheless, both the social system and the system of the state power organization prevented it from playing its full role. The lack of necessary legal instruments was an obstacle to this as well, but this obstacle was surmounted by the 2006 Constitution. However, the 2006 Constitution did not resolve all the predicaments concerning the institution of constitutional court. Among those predicaments are the number of judges method and terms and conditions of their election, as well as their new competences. Some perplexities emerged as far as the character and scope of the judge's competences goes, mainly in the sphere of elections and constitutional complaints, but also in the cases of special complaints. In addition, the constitutional provision on preliminary control of the constitutionality of laws may come under critique. Two procedural questions deserve further analysis: the initiation of procedure before the Constitutional Court and the role of public hearing. The effects of Court decisions in the classical constitutional issues (judicial review of constitutionality of laws and other normative acts, and judicial review of legality of sub laws) are not questionable, but in some of the new competences those effects are not regulated in a suitable manner. Still, the main problem concerning Serbian Constitutional Court reveals itself outside of the institutional level. The institution of Constitutional Court in Serbia suffered from complete marginalization in the socialist era (1946-1990), and people's conscience of its significance is yet to be built. The Constitutional Court was twice out of function since 2000, both times for more than a year, either because of the lack of judges, or because the election of judges was overdue.