The Constitutional Court of Serbia made in 2011 and 2012 four decisions on proposals of the Republic Prosecutor for placing a ban on the work of a few formal and informal civil associations. The author analyzes these decisions as initial enclosures in favor of jurisprudence of militant democracy. He criticizes their inconsistencies and contradictions as well as the absence of theoretical approach. He discusses the relationship between court practice and theory and reminds of the teachings on limits of freedom in the works of Popper, Rawls, Hart, Dahl and Raz. The author concludes that militant protection is a sign of endangered, unprepared and weakened democracy which lacks strength to marginalize enemies through bringing attitudes face to face. The decisions of the Constitutional Court on forbidding the work of certain associations indirectly mean recognition that such forces do not exist in Serbia or that they are weak. After two decisions which forbid the work, the decision by which the last proposal for forbidding is refused, in the situation when tolerance in the society is getting smaller, for enemies of freedom it works urging. As basic weakness of the discussed decisions the author quotes: preponderance of phactographic approach over analytic one and resorting to linear deduction in explaining complex social phenomena.