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2021, vol. 16, br. 2, str. 127-150
State capture and collective action
(naslov ne postoji na srpskom)
Italy

e-adresaandrea.capussela@gmail.com
Ključne reči: state capture; collective action; social orders; institutions
Sažetak
(ne postoji na srpskom)
A promising approach to analyse the phenomena usually described as 'state capture' may be drawn from the literature on 'institutions', 'social orders', and the 'collective action problem'. These studies seem broader and more theoretically persuasive than the literature that confines itself to the notion of 'state capture', and this is especially true in respect of the Balkans, in whose societies it is often hard to draw a fine line between the 'captured' state and its 'captors'. Seen through the lens of those strands of literature, the phenomena usually described as state capture appear to be more widespread than is currently assumed, as they also surface in advanced democracies, and behind them typically lie collective action problems, which prevent the public interest from imposing itself over special interests.
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O članku

jezik rada: engleski
vrsta rada: izvorni naučni članak
DOI: 10.5937/jrs0-34271
primljen: 14.05.2021.
prihvaćen: 12.10.2021.
objavljen u SCIndeksu: 24.12.2021.
metod recenzije: dvostruko anoniman